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Fighting for the Rights of Others: The
Troubled Law of Third-Party Standing and
Mootness in the Federal Courts
BY

MARC ROHR*
The author examines the development and current status

of third-party standing in the federal courts, with special attention to its justification in light of the Supreme Court's decisions on mootness in class actions. ProfessorRohr suggests that
for the sake of clarity, economy, and consistency of approach,

federal courts should grant third-partystanding to any litigant
who appears reasonably likely to give adequate representation
to the interests of the third parties whose rights the litigant
wishes to assert.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court, during the last eighty years, has stated
consistently that a party to civil or criminal litigation has standing
to raise only his own rights before a federal court in challenging
allegedly illegal governmental action.' According to this general
rule, a litigant may not argue that the governmental conduct that
causes him harm should be enjoined or declared illegal simply because the conduct infringes on the rights of a third party. The Supreme Court has stated that the "case or controversy" clause of
article III does not prohibit "third-party standing" (as I shall call
it); that clause requires only that the litigant possess a "personal
stake" in the outcome of the litigation-that he suffer "injury in
fact," presently or imminently, from the conduct he challenges.2
The third-party standing rule is clearly not of constitutional magnitude, but rather is a judicially self-imposed "prudential" limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court.3
Federal courts have not applied this rule uniformly. In the last
ten years, the Supreme Court has allowed third-party standing in
at least seven of thirteen decisions in which it squarely faced the
issue. 4 By now it is well understood that there exist "exceptions"
1. E.g., Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979); Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978); Williams v. Eggleston, 170
U.S. 304, 309 (1898).
2. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112, 123 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499500 (1975).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255
(1953).
4. The Court permitted third-party standing in: Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
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to the general rule.' The question is whether the rule and its exceptions, taken together as a body of legal doctrine, makes sense.
The problem is not primarily one of bad results, but of confused
and confusing theory-which, of course, carries the serious potential for bad results in future cases.
With one notable exception,' the Supreme Court did not use
the rule against third-party standing in cases arising during the
past decade to restrict access to the federal courts.7 Courts could
use the rule for such purposes, however, unless it is properly redefined. The Supreme Court applied the rule for many years and in
many cases, before attempting to fully explain it in Singleton v.
Wulff.8 Because of the ad hoc development of exceptions to the
rule in earlier cases, 9 however, any attempt to harmonize those
cases was bound to fail. The rule sweeps too broadly, and the
stated exceptions seem to be mere rationalizations for past departures from an overbroad rule. The rule against third-party standing should be narrowly restated, particularly in light of the recent
developments in the related area of mootness in class actions. 10
Given the present exceptions to the rule, the resulting gain in theoretical harmony and correctness of results will probably not be offset by any significant increase in the caseloads of the federal
courts. Moreover, eliminating the requirement of surmounting an
unnecessary obstacle will better serve judicial economy.
(1972). The Court denied third-party standing in: Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("Gilmore was competent to waive his right to appeal," and as his
access to the courts was unimpeded, "a third party has no standing to litigate an Eighth
Amendment claim . . .on his behalf." Id. at 1017); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);
Mercer v. Michigan St. Bd. of Educ., 419 U.S. 1081, a/f'g 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.
1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S.
351 (1971).
The Court may also have implicitly permitted third-party standing in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975), and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
5. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See
also notes 84-127 and accompanying text infra.
6. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
7. Several commentators have criticized the restrictive standing decisions of the Supreme Court in the mid-1970's. See, e.g., Davis, Standing, 1976, 72 Nw. L. REv. 69 (1977);
Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 390 (1980);
Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposals for Legislative
Reform, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 863 (1977); Tushnet, The New Law of Standing, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 663 (1977); Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to ProfessorBrilmayer,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980). See also Varet, Variable Justiciabilityand the Duke Power
Case, 58 TEx. L. REV. 273 (1980).
8. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
9. See text accompanying notes 53-82 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 221-70 infra.
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This article sets forth the present federal law of third-party
standing, critically examines the stated rationales for the rule and
its exceptions, and argues for a restatement of the rule based upon
pragmatic concerns and the need for clarity and consistency in the
law.
II.

THE LAW OF THIRD-PARTY STANDING IN THE SUPREME COURT

Before the re-emergence of the rule in constitutional litigation
of the 1970's, the Supreme Court repeatedly invoked the rule
against third-party standing during the first quarter of this century, often in response to constitutional challenges to state and
federal laws regulating some aspect of economic life."1
A.

The Development of the Third-Party Standing Doctrine
1.

THE HYPOTHETICAL VICTIM

Heald v. District of Columbia 2 illustrates well how the Court
originally conceived of and applied the rule. A resident of the District of Columbia filed suit, seeking a refund of property taxes paid
to the District. He argued that the Court should hold void the statute imposing the tax because it applied to persons engaged in business in the District, even if the property was not located within the
District, thus exceeding the power of Congress to make laws pertaining to the District. The District responded "that such is not
the correct construction of the act, that it has not in fact been so
construed or applied by the taxing officials . . . . ' The Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff could not raise this objection, "even if
otherwise well founded," because his property was located within
the District and he resided therein. Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote:
It has been repeatedly held that one who would strike down a
state statute as violative of the Federal Constitution must show
that he is within the class of persons with respect to whom the
act is unconstitutional and that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him. In no case has it been held that a different rule
11. See, e.g., Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571, 576 (1915); Erie R. R. v. Williams,

233 U.S. 685, 705 (1914); Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 648 (1914);
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 544 (1914); Farmers Mechanics & Say.
Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U.S. 516, 530 (1914); Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U.S. 390, 398 (1912);
Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); Lee v. New Jersey,
207 U.S. 67 (1907); Hooker v. Burr, 194 U.S. 415 (1904); Lampasas v. Bell, 180 U.S. 276

(1901); Tyler v. Judges of the Ct. of Regis., 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
12. 259 U.S. 114 (1922).
13. Id. at 123.
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applies where the statute assailed is an act of Congress; nor has
any good reason been suggested why it should be so held."
The Supreme Court applied this general rule in similar situations," in which a litigant conceded the constitutionality of the
statute as applied to him, but contended that the statute applied
unconstitutionally to at least one other category of persons within
the purview of the statute; therefore, he argued, the court must
find the statute unconstitutional and void as to all persons. Generally, courts rejected the argument, but rarely in terms of "standing" or in reference to article III, and rarely with as much explanation as Mr. Justice Brandeis gave in the Heald decision. The
plaintiff in Heald did have article III standing, because the tax injured him; but he lacked a particular kind of standing-namely,
standing to raise the third-party argument.
Before Heald, the most extensive explanation appeared in
New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon," in which the Court rejected
a constitutional challenge to a state tax statute based on the claim
that the tax burdened interstate commerce. The party making the
challenge had been convicted for nonpayment of a tax relating to a
transaction unrelated to interstate commerce. The Court did not
allow the litigant to raise this argument, stating that it would "not
go into imaginary cases. 1 7 "If the law is valid when confined to the
class of the party before the court," the opinion continued, "it may
be more or less of a speculation to inquire what exceptions the
state court may read into general words, or how far it may sustain
an act that partially fails." 6 The Court restated this rationale in
1953 in Barrows v. Jackson,1 9 a case in which the rule against
third-party standing was not applied.
One reason for this ruling is that the state court, when actually
faced with the question, might narrowly construe the statute to
obliterate the objectionable feature, or it might declare the unconstitutional provisions separable .... It would indeed be un14. Id.

15. E.g., United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930); Aikins v. Kingsbury, 247 U.S.
484 (1918); Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 648 (1914); Darnell v. Indiana,
226 U.S. 390, 398 (1912); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217
(1912); Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U.S. 540, 550 (1912); Williams v. Walsh, 222
U.S. 415, 423 (1912); Lee v. New Jersey, 207 U.S. 67 (1907); Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447,
457 (1905).
16. 204 U.S. 152 (1907).
17. Id. at 160.
18. Id. at 161.
19. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:393

desirable for this Court to consider every conceivable situation
in the application of complex and
which might possibly arise
20
comprehensive legislation.
The Court applied the rule again in 1960, in United States v.
Raines,'2 in which the United States had sued Georgia county officials for equitable relief under the Civil Rights Act of 1957. The
defendants challenged the Act on the ground that its terms did not
limit its application to official (as opposed to purely private) action, and that it therefore exceeded Congress's power under the
fifteenth amendment. The Court held that the defendants could
not raise this objection, because their argument pertained to persons (private individuals) outside the defendants' classification.
The Court ruled correctly in Heald and Raines, basing its decisions on the reasoning expressed in Hatch and Barrows. Although the litigants had every incentive to litigate, they raised
purely hypothetical applications of a statute to purely hypothetical
"victims" of its alleged unconstitutionality. If a court can limit the
statute by construction, the statute cannot be applied in the unconstitutional fashion suggested by the litigant. Even if the litigant
challenges a federal statute, good reason may exist for the court to
defer the task of construction, awaiting a more concrete factual
setting.2 Although a federal court could simply state in advance
that a particular statute must be construed in a certain way to be
constitutional, to begin such a task probably would involve the
courts in anticipating "every conceivable situation" that might
arise.2 Deferring such a decision would cause no great loss, especially because state courts, in a great many cases, will construe
statutes to avoid unconstitutional applications.
It is in this "hypothetical victim" situation that the thirdparty standing rule has its purest and most desirable application.2 4
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 256.
362 U.S. 17 (1960).
E.g., Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114 (1922).
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. at 256.
See H.L. v. Matheson, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981); County Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 155

(1979).
The Supreme Court has long applied a salutary exception to the general rule governing
statutory overbreadth (or "hypothetical victim") cases where the plaintiff claims the challenged statute infringes upon constitutionally protected freedom of speech. E.g., Lewis v.
City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). The litigant raising such a challenge need

not show that his own conduct is constitutionally protected. Mr. Justice Blackmun has
stated concisely:
The reason for the special rule in First Amendment cases is apparent: An over-
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But the early cases in which the Court applied the rule did not

involve only hypothetical victims. With no additional explanation,
the Court gave the same treatment to cases in which a category of

third persons clearly existed and clearly had suffered injury as a
result of the allegedly unconstitutional statute. In Engel v.
O'Malley," for example, the Court denied a plaintiff standing to
challenge a state licensing statute on the ground that it imposed an
allegedly unconstitutional residency requirement; the plaintiff satisfied this requirement, yet surely persons existed who did not satisfy the requirement. 6 In Farmers Mechanics Savings Bank v.
Minnesota,7 the Court held that a savings bank, as a defendant in
a civil case brought under a statute, could not raise an equal probroad statute might serve to chill protected speech. First Amendment interests
are fragile interests, and a person who contemplates protected activity might be
discouraged by the in terrorem effect of the statute. . . The use of overbreadth
analysis reflects the conclusion that the possible harm to society from allowing
unprotected speech to go unpunished is overweighed by the possibility that protected speech will be muted.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977).
Courts applied this exception in a relatively simple manner until the Supreme Court
decided Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). Mr. Justice White, writing for a bare
majority of the Court, referred to the exception as "strong medicine," id. at 613, and stated
that "particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to
the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Id. at 615. The Court held that, where plaintiffs
conceded the constitutionality of the Oklahoma law governing political activities by state
employees as applied to them, they lacked standing to challenge the statute as facially invalid. See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 59 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 162 (1974); see generally L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTlMNAL LAW §§ 12-24 to
27, at 710-18 (1978); Note, First Amendment Vagueness and Overbreadth: Theoretical Revisions by the Burger Court, 31 VAND. L. REv. 609 (1978). The Court has also declined to
apply its exceptional first amendment overbreadth doctrine to professional advertising,
viewing such commercial speech as unlikely to be easily deterred by overbroad regulation.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. at 380 (1977).
One should not confuse overbreadth with vagueness, although a given statute often suffers from both vices. A court will hold a statute unconstitutionally vague if the statute fails
to give fair notice of its meaning. For standing purposes, no exception to the general rule
exists for a vagueness challenge even when the allegedly vague statute deals with speech. If
the court finds the statute not vague as to the litigant (meaning that the statute gives fair
notice of its application to his conduct even though it may be uncertain as to other applications), the court will not permit him to argue that the statute is vague as to others. Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930). See
generally, L. TRmE, supra, §§ 12-28 and 29, at 718-21; see also Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
767, 773 (1977). Although this unexceptional treatment of standing to raise vagueness challenges in speech cases has received criticism as insufficiently sensitive to first amendment
concerns, see Note, supra, at 636, it coincides with the general approach in "hypothetical
victim" cases.
25. 219 U.S. 128 (1911).
26. Id. at 135.
27. 232 U.S. 516 (1914).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:393

tection challenge to the validity of the statute's application to
other kinds of banks that, along with the defendant, clearly fell
within a certain classification under the statute.2 8 In Sprout v. City
of South Bend,2 9 the Court found that a criminal defendant, required to carry liability insurance with an insurer authorized to do
business in Indiana, could not claim that the state law discriminated improperly against other insurance companies.3 0 In several
decisions the Court determined that a litigant could not challenge
a statute on the ground that it was under-inclusive in the protection it afforded to its beneficiaries, in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 1 Again, there was no
question that discriminatees existed. A later case, Tileston v. UUIman, 2 fits into this "real-victim" category; a physician sought a
declaratory judgment, asserting the unconstitutionality of a state
statute that prohibited the giving of assistance in the use of contraceptives. The statute allegedly deprived three of the plaintiff's
patients of their rights under the fourteenth amendment due process clause. The Court held that the plaintiff physician lacked
standing to press this claim, because he did not belong to the class
of persons who had suffered injury.8 3
If these cases are correct, it is not because the litigants raised
speculative controversies about purely hypothetical victims. What
other reasons, then, support the application of the general rule in
these cases?
2.

CAUSALITY AND SEVERABILITY

In at least a few cases, one can justify the Supreme Court's
invocation of the general rule by the application of other, more
28. Id. at 530.
29. 277 U.S. 163 (1928).

30. Id. at 167.
31. Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571, 576 (1915) (employer challenging statute on
grounds of discrimination against employees, held not covered by statute); Erie R.R. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685, 705 (1914) (same); Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260, 270 (1912)
(criminal defendant convicted of receiving stolen goods challenging limitation on classes of
victims, held protected by statute). A litigant raising such an equal protection claim has
little chance of success. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
32. 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
33. See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), in which a black plain-

tiff had standing to challenge the racially discriminatory guest practices of a club, but not
its membership policy; the club had denied him entrance as a guest, but he had not applied
for membership. One cannot say with certainty that any black person had ever applied for
membership in the club, but at the same time one can hardly characterize the dispute over
the membership policy as hypothetical, in light of the reality of the guest policy.
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fundamental principles. The Court in Warth v. Seldin s" and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization" held that
a plaintiff lacks standing when no causal relationship exists between the challenged governmental action and the plaintiff's injury. Thus, courts will not confer standing if a victory for the
plaintiff will not likely provide him relief. One must look at the
facts of each case and ask: If the court grants the relief requested,
will this prevent or redress plaintiff's injury? Will this put him in a
better position, vis-i-vis the defendant, than he is in at present?
An affirmative answer supports a grant of standing. This makes
sense as an aspect of the "personal stake" requirement, because it
presumes that proper advocacy and concreteness depend on the
plaintiff's having something tangible to gain from the suit.
When a plaintiff successfully challenges the validity of one
section of a statute, but not of all the sections, the entire statute
does not necessarily fall. The valid or unchallenged sections may
stand, if the legislature that enacted the statute intended the remaining valid sections to stand despite invalidation of some sections by the court." When a court finds that the legislature intended this principle to apply, the statute is "severable." If the
court finds that the legislature had a contrary intent, the statute is
nonseverable, and a successful challenge to any section will render
the entire statute void. A similar analysis applies to multiple applications of a particular section of a statute. If a plaintiff successfully challenges a particular application, the court may deem the
statute void in its entirety, or may deem it invalid, and therefore
3
inapplicable, only as applied in a particular context. 7
This explains, in part, why constitutional challenges to statutory overbreadth on behalf of "hypothetical victims" should not
and do not cause concern for courts. If the presently hypothetical
victim should become, in the future, a real victim of the statute,
34. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
35. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
36. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585
(1968). The Court, in both of these cases, quoted the following language from Champlin
Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm., 286 U.S. 210 (1932):
The unconstitutionality of a part of an Act does not necessarily defeat ... the
validity of its remaining provisions. Unless it is evident that the legislature
would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is
fully operative as a law.
Id. at 234.
37. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973); United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 375 n.3 (1971).
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and a successful challenger thereto, the court probably will deem
severable the statutory provision in question and avoid having to
render all of its applications invalid. Combining these two principles, a plaintiff's challenge to a single provision of a severable statute must fail when that particular section did not cause the injury
to the plaintiff; it must fail because the remainder of the statute,
and thus his injury, will survive his legal challenge even if he succeeds in the suit. The plaintiff thus lacks standing under well-established principles, and the court need not invoke the rule against
third-party standing.
Such cases have come before the Supreme Court, but rarely, if
ever, has the Court expressly based its decision on severability and
causation principles." Rather, it has either spoken ambiguously or
invoked the rule against third-party standing. Engel v. O'Malley"
is an example. The plaintiff, who engaged in the business of receiving deposits of money for safekeeping or transmission to others,
challenged a state law that forbade him from engaging in such activity without a license. He could not obtain a license because he
could not afford to comply with the statutory requirements that he
deposit ten thousand dollars and post a bond with the regulatory
agency. The plaintiff claimed that the five-year residency requirement imposed by the state violated the fourteenth amendment;
however, this requirement formed no apparent obstacle for him.
"As the plaintiff alleges that he satisfies this requirement," wrote
Mr. Justice Holmes, "he has nothing to complain of.'

0

The Court

should have denied standing to complain about this residency requirement, not because he raised the rights of others, but because
the Court could have held the statute severable; the deposit and
bond requirements of the statute would have continued to bar him
even if his argument prevailed. 1
38. Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 42 (1923), represents one of those rare occasions; the statute contained a severability clause.
39. 219 U.S. 128 (1911).
40. Id. at 135.
41. See also Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304 (1898). Pursuant to authority conferred by an 1893 Connecticut statute, a state board entered into a contract with the Berlin
Iron Bridge Company for the construction of a certain bridge. Two years later, the legislature enacted a new statute repealing the 1893 statute, apparently terminating the contract
with Berlin, and directing that five towns bear the cost of certain highway improvements.
One of the towns, Glastonbury, challenged assessments made against it under the 1895 act,
contending, inter alia, that the 1893 act improperly impaired the obligation of the state's
contract with Berlin. Berlin, meanwhile, had been compensated to its satisfaction for the
breach. The Court rejected the challenges stating: "The parties to a contract are the ones to
complain of a breach, and if they are satisfied. . ., a third party has no right to insist that it
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A variation on the theme occurs when the plaintiff, a party
properly classified and regulated under a statute, argues that a
similarly regulated class, to which the plaintiff does not belong,
comprises the collective victims of improper discrimination under
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause resulting from
their inclusion in the statutory scheme. If the court finds the statute nonseverable, it should allow the challenge by the plaintiff, for
the entire statute will fall if he succeeds, providing redress for the
plaintiff. If the court finds the statute severable, however, plaintiff
can succeed only in helping the class of third parties escape from
the coverage of the statute, accomplishing nothing for himself; the
court will properly deny standing.4 2
- The Supreme Court has allowed standing
in the few cases in
which a court has held nonseverable a federal statute 48 or regulation, or state law."" Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in
has been broken." Id. at 309. Later, however, the Court noted that Glastonbury's injury,
although resulting from the 1895 statute, did not result- from that section of the statute
abrogating the contract with Berlin. "It is not the breach of any contract, but an independent act of the legislature which casts the burden on the town of Glastonbury." Id. This is
the real reason why the town's standing should have been rejected.
See generally Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 132 n.4 (1979); Ashcroft v. Freiman, 440
U.S. 942 (1979), aff'g 584 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1978). State law governs the question of severability of a state statute, although a federal court may look to that state law in resolving
such a question. See, e.g., Moore v. Fowinkle, 512 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1975). See also Bell v.
Hongisto, 501 F.2d 346, 355 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). It is generally
true, however, that courts presently have no occasion to determine questions of severability
in advance of determining questions of constitutionality, whereas my suggested approach
would require them to do so. But the federal "test" of severability, see note 36, supra, approaches a presumption of severability, and one could fairly apply a similar presumption to
state statutes; such a presumption, if unrebutted, would result in a denial of third-party
standing.
42. See, e.g., Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407, 413 (1936); Farmers & Mechanics Say.
Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U.S. 516, 530 (1914).
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), suggests no contrary principles. That case involved a
challenge to the constitutionality of Alabama alimony statutes which provided that husbands, but not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce. Because the plaintiff
husband apparently claimed no entitlement to alimony, the possibility existed that his challenge, if successful, would lead the state to amend the statute, and thus eliminate the discrimination, with no resulting gain for him. The Court held that he had standing, however,
because the state might, in the alternative, repeal the entire statute in response to a victory
for the plaintiff. Id. at 272. This case, then, did not involve a plaintiff who could not possibly gain by attacking a statutory classification. Accord, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210
n.24 (1976).
43. E.g., The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 501 (1908). See also Butts v.
Merchants & Miners Trans. Co., 230 U.S. 126 (1913).
44. E.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. McKendree, 303 U.S. 514, 529 (1906).
45. E.g., Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,
243 U.S. 219, 234 (1917); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197 (1917).
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United States v. Raines,46 described such a case as "that rarest of
cases where this court can justifiably think itself able confidently
to discern that Congress would not have desired its legislation 'to
47
stand at all unless it could validly stand in its every application.
In such a case the plaintiff, whom the statute could validly regulate, may challenge the constitutionality of the statute even with
respect to third parties whose existence is uncertain. Because the
court, having held the statute nonseverable, can strike down the
statute in its entirety if it finds anything wrong with it, the court
properly permits an injured litigant to show that the statute would
have an unconstitutional application to a third party.
B. Modern Justifications for the Third-Party Standing
Doctrine
But one cannot explain every case in which the Court has denied third-party standing on the basis of hypothetical overbreadth,
on the one hand, or the severability and causation principles on
the other. What other justifications underlie the general rule
against third-party standing? Mr. Justice Powell provided one response to this question in 1975, writing for the majority in Warth
v. Seldin." After stating the general rule, he wrote:

Without such limitations-closely related to Article III concerns
but essentially matters of judicial self-governance-the courts
would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public
significance even though other governmental institutions may be
more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual
rights.4

But how is the question "abstract" when there is a real victim of
the allegedly unlawful conduct, and a live controversy involving
46. 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
47. Id. at 23 (citing the Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 501 (1908), and the

Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97-98 (1879)). Mr. Justice Brennan conceded that cases
existed in which the Court had not applied these rules "with perfect consistency," 362 U.S.
at 24 (citing Illinois Cent. R.R. v. McKendree, 203 U.S. 514 (1906), and United States v. Ju
Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 262-63 (1905)). The Court might also have included Wuchter v. Pizzuti,
276 U.S. 13 (1928), in which the Court permitted a civil defendant who had been served
with process to challenge a state statute which did not explicitly require that the defendant
in such a case be personally served. The case falls into the hypothetical victim category, but
may be explainable on the basis of nonseverability, although the Court did not address the
issue.
48. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
49. Id. at 500.
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the injured litigant, even though the litigant may not be the theoretical victim of the unlawfulness? What defines judicial intervention as "unnecessary" in such a case, other than the conclusory
reasoning that assumes the general rule? What is the relevance of
the allegedly greater competence of other governmental institutions for a litigant who faces undesirable consequences if he cannot
successfully challenge unlawful conduct?
In Singleton v. Wulff" in 1976, Mr. Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion offered the fullest discussion of, and a pragmatic explanation for, this legal doctrine:
The reasons are two. First, the courts should not adjudicate such
rights unnecessarily, and it may be that in fact the holders of
those rights either do not wish to assert them, or will be able to
enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litiganf is successful or not ....
Second, third parties themselves usually will be
the best proponents of their own rights. The courts depend on
effective advocacy, and therefore should prefer to construe legal
rights only when the most effective advocates of those rights are
before them. The holders of the rights may have a like preference, to the extent they will be bound by the courts' decisions
under the doctrine of stare decisis.51
The Court actually offers four rationales:
(1) The third party may not wish to assert his rights.
(2) The third party's enjoyment of his rights may remain
completely unaffected by what happens to the litigant.
(3) The court should hear from only the most effective advocate, who generally will be the third party.
(4) A decision adverse to the litigant who asserts the rights
of third parties will constitute unfavorable precedent that
may impair the ability of the third party to assert his
own rights later.
The first rationale is of questionable significance. Although
one may waive a constitutional right, does anyone have a right not
to have that right asserted by another? Because the right could
surely be raised by another member of the class of third-party
rightholders, the suggestion that nobody else should raise it is
hardly persuasive.
Similarly, why should it matter that the third party's rights
may remain unaffected by the result in the litigant's case? Giving
50. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
51. Id. at 113-14.
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importance to that possibility assumes that courts should confer
third-party standing only in order to assist the third party. Aside
from the hypothetical victim cases and other cases in which the
court appropriately denies standing, however, in typical thirdparty standing cases the third party is a "real victim" of the allegedly unlawful conduct and would benefit (in theory, at least) from
a victory for the litigant. The second rationale thus makes sense
only if we deem it important that a defeat for the litigant would
not necessarily result in a total defeat for the third party.
Significantly, four of the Justices expressed little interest in
the third rationale. Mr. Justice Powell, writing for himself and
three other Justices in his partially dissenting opinion in Singleton, took a different view of the reasoning behind the rule:
I agree with the plurality ...

that a fundamental policy behind

the general rule is a salutary desire to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication ....

The plurality perceives a second ba-

sis for the rule in the courts' need for effective advocacy. While
this concern is relevant, it should receive no more emphasis in
this context than in the context of Art. III standing requirements. There the need for effective advocacy or a factual sharpening of issues long was the touchstone of discussion.2
In other words, the existence of "injury in fact" to the litigant suffices to insure the likelihood of effective advocacy. In Mr. Justice
Powell's mind, then, only the conclusory characterization of thirdparty standing as typically leading to "unnecessary" adjudication
remains as a reason for the rule.
The fourth reason also is unpersuasive; no member of a class
of third-party victims could prevent a similarly situated member
from bringing an action that would result in the creation of adverse precedent. If the court prevents a non-member of that thirdparty class from bringing the action, it should do so only because
the court perceives him to be a less effective advocate. As Mr. Justice Powell has recognized, however, there is no general reason to
reach that conclusion as long as the litigant was "injured in fact."
But what the Court has taken away under the general rule, it
has largely given back under the attendant exceptions. Consider
now some of the cases in which the Court has permitted thirdparty standing.
52. Id. at 124 n.3.
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III.

CASES GRANTING THIRD-PARTY STANDING

The famous case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters53 implicitly
permitted private schools to challenge the constitutionality of a
state criminal statute requiring parents to send their children to
public schools on the ground that the statute "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. ' 54 The
Court noted that enforcement of the statute "would seriously impair, perhaps destroy, the profitable features of appellees' business
and greatly diminish the value of their property, 5 5 and observed
that the plaintiff schools already had begun to lose students and
income. 6 As Mr. Justice Powell noted in Singleton,1 the Pierce
Court did not discuss standing explicitly, but the decision represents a realization that the third-party standing rule must be
reexamined.
A. Explicit Grants of Third-Party Standing
1.

EARLY EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE

The Supreme Court expressly permitted third-party standing
in a number of civil rights cases, beginning with Buchanan v.
Warley" in 1§17. Buchanan, a white man, contracted to sell a parcel of real estate located in the City of Louisville to Warley, a
black man. Under the circumstances of the case, a city ordinance
prohibited a black person from residing on that property, and
Warley relied on this ordinance in refusing to go through with the
purchase. Buchanan thereupon sued Warley for specific performance, arguing that the court must hold the ordinance unconstitutional because it discriminated against blacks. A member of the
"third-party" class thus opposed the litigant who raised the rights
of that class (although, in this case, the defendant may have felt
obliged to litigate but hoped he would lose in his defense of the
ordinance). 59
The Court raised and quickly disposed of the standing issue;
the Court apparently did not view Buchanan as a third-party
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 534-35.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 532.
428 U.S. at 129 n.6.
245 U.S. 60 (1917).
Id. at 72.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:393

standing case, because
[t]he right of the plaintiff in error to sell his property was directly involved and necessarily impaired because it was held in
effect that he could not sell the lot to a person of color who was
willing and ready to acquire the property, and had obligated
himself to take it.s°
It is not clear whether the Court meant that the white seller's
own fourteenth amendment rights (the right to convey property
free of racial restrictions) were involved, which would imply that
this case did not involve third-party standing," or whether the
Court simply confused the issue of third-party standing with the
article III requirement of "injury in fact."
In 1953, the Court faced the issue of third-party standing in a
second civil rights case, Barrows v. Jackson.6 2 The litigant, a white
property owner, breached a restrictive covenant by selling the
property to a black family. The case raised the question whether
the seller could raise the constitutional rights of the purchasers in
defending herself against a suit for damages brought by some of
her co-covenantors. The Supreme Court, speaking for the first time
in terms of an exception to the general rule, answered affirmatively. After setting forth the rule and its rationale,6" the Court
stated:
This is a salutary rule, the validity of which we reaffirm. But in
the instant case, we are faced with a unique situation in which it
is the action of the state court which might result in a denial of
constitutional rights and in which it would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights are asserted to present
their grievance before any court. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe the reasons which underlie our
rule denying standing to raise another's rights, which is only a
rule of practice, are outweighed by the need to protect the fundamental rights which would be
denied by permitting the dam4

ages action to be maintained.

60. Id. at 73.
61. "In the racial restriction cases, it would not be difficult to find a constitutional right
of property owners to sell free of state-enforced restrictions based on race." 13 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531 at 208-09 (1975). See
also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 80 (1978).
62. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
63. See text accompanying note 20 supra.

64. 346 U.S. at 257. A successful damage action, of course, would have the effect of
discouraging the breach of such covenants.
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The Court justified its decision by describing the defendant as
The
"the only effective adversary of the unworthy covenant.'
in
rule
the
rejected
had
similarly
case
Pierce
Court stated that the
6
favor of more important constitutional goals.
In Runyon v. McCrary,'7 a segregated private school in Virginia denied admission to two black children based solely on race.
The Court made a simple reference to Pierce in explaining why
racially-segregated private schools had standing to raise the asserted constitutional rights of white students and their parents (all
of which the Court rejected) in defense of an action brought under
section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act. "It is clear that the schools
have standing to assert these arguments on behalf of their patrons," wrote Mr. Justice Stewart in a footnote, citing Pierce.'s
The Court carved out further exceptions in the context of controversies over the use of contraceptives and abortions. In Griswold v. Connecticuts a physician and an executive director of the
Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut advised married
couples about contraceptives; the Court granted them standing to
raise the constitutional rights of married people in defending
themselves against criminal prosecution for aiding and abetting the
use of contraceptives. Mr. Justice Douglas distinguished the case of
Tileston v. Ullman,70 noting that there the physician was a plain65. Id. at 259.
66. Id. at 257. Another civil rights case, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S.
229 (1969), relied heavily upon Barrows for resolution of a less crucial standing question.
Sullivan, a white homeowner, owned two membership shares in Little Hunting Park, Inc., a
corporation organized to operate a community park and playground facilities for the benefit
of its shareholders. Sullivan leased one of his two houses in the area to Freeman, a black,
and assigned Freeman one of his membership shares as well. The board of directors of Little
Hunting Park refused to approve the assignment to Freeman, explicitly on racial grounds,
and, moreover, expelled Sullivan. Both Sullivan and Freeman sued under 42 U.S.C. §§ 198182 (1976) for damages and injunctive relief. On the question of Sullivan's standing, Mr.
Justice Douglas recalled the statement in Barrows "that the white owner is at times 'the
only effective adversary' of the unlawful restrictive covenant. Under the terms of. our decision in Barrows, there can be no question but that Sullivan has standing to maintain this
action." Id. at 237. The majority opinion does not make clear, however, whether Sullivan
had standing to raise Freeman's rights, or whether Sullivan had some claim of his own
under the civil rights laws. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, id. at 254-55.
Given Freeman's presence in the litigation, third-party standing seems unnecessary, and the
reference to Barrows superfluous.
67. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
68. Id. at 175 n.13.
69. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70. 318 U.S. 44 (1943). In Tileston, the Court denied standing to physician-petitioner
to raise constitutional issues. The petitioner alleged that the state law, prohibiting use of
drugs or instruments to prevent conception, prevented him from advising certain patients
whose health could be endangered. The Court held that the patients themselves had to raise
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tiff seeking declaratory relief.
Here. . . doubts [about the plaintiff's interest] are removed by
reason of a criminal conviction for serving married couples in
violation of an aiding-and-abetting statute. Certainly the accessory should have standing to assert that the offense which he is
charged
with assisting is not, or cannot constitutionally be, a
71
crime.

This statement, although appealing, conflicts with the general
rule forbidding third-party standing when the accessory argues
that the conduct unconstitutionally penalizes the principal. Did
Mr. Justice Douglas intend to suggest that Tileston was still good
law, and that a criminal defendant is an acceptable representative
of third-party rights, whereas it will not so find for a civil plaintiff?
Earlier case law, however, does not support this arguably valid distinction. 2 Moreover, Mr. Justice Douglas placed Griswold with
cases like Pierce and Barrows, as exceptions to the rule, adding:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a
suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to
7
them."

2.

A THEORY EMERGES

Seven years later, the Court decided Eisenstadt v. Baird'4 another civil rights case. Baird, convicted under a Massachusetts
statute for unlawfully dispensing contraceptives, sought to challenge the statute as violative of the constitutional rights of single
persons denied access to contraceptives; Baird did not belong to
this class. The Court held that Baird had sufficient interest in
challenging the validity of the statute, and granted standing. Mr.
Justice Brennan's majority opinion, with respect to the standing
issue, can be divided into two parts. First, in response to the argument that no relationship between litigant and victim existed here
the constitutional issues.
71. 381 U.S. at 481. As with the racial restriction cases, see notes 53-56 and accompanying text supra, it has been suggested that Griswold may not truly be a third-party standing

case. "In Griswold v. Connecticut, it would be easy to find a constitutional right not to be
convicted as an accessory to conduct that could not constitutionally be made criminal for
the principals." 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 61, § 3531 at 208.
72. The Court denied third-party standing for criminal defendants in Sprout v. City of
South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 167 (1928), and Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260, 270 (1912).

See also Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919) (civil contempt).
73. 381 U.S. at 481.
74. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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as it did in Griswold, Mr. Justice Brennan compared this case to
Barrows, which involved a "relationship between one who acted to
protect the rights of a minority and the minority itself."' 75 "And so

here," he continued,
the relationship between Baird and those whose rights he seeks
to assert is not simply that between a distributor and potential
distributees, but that between an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so.
The very point of Baird's giving away the vaginal foam was to
challenge the Massachusetts
statute that limited access to
6
contraceptives.7

What kind of relationship is that? More to the point, what is
its significance? Would not any would-be advocate of third-party
rights have that kind of relationship with the third parties? Is it
important that the advocacy preceded the litigation (not clearly
the case in Barrows) and, if so, why? But more important than the
relationship, Mr. Justice Brennan continued, "is the impact of the
litigation on the third-party interests. ' '77 Enforcement of the stat-

ute in this case would "materially
impair the ability of single per7 8
sons to obtain contraceptives.

The Court again encountered the third-party standing issue in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,79 in which two physicians challenged the constitutionality of the Missouri abortion statute. The
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Blackmun, decided quickly-and carelessly-that the physicians had standing. "This was
established in Doe v. Bolton,"80 stated Mr. Justice-Blackmun, who
went on to point out that, as in that case involving the Georgia
abortion statutes, the physicians in Planned Parenthood faced
possible criminal prosecution if they violated the statute; hence
they satisfied the requirement of present or imminent "injury in
fact."'" But at no point in the opinion did the Court explain why
the physicians had standing to raise the constitutional rights of
their patients.
75. Id. at 445.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 446. He also noted that mere users of contraceptives were not subject to prosecution, and thus "to that extent, . . . [were] denied a forum in which to assert their own
rights." Id. This does not mean, however, that third parties were completely unable to assert their own rights.
79. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
80. Id. at 62.
81. Id.

'412
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Doe v. Bolton82 does not help answer that question because in
that case the group of plaintiffs consisted, in part, of the pregnant
women themselves; because of this, the Court noted, the question
of the physicians' standing in Doe became "perhaps a matter of no
great consequence."" The opinion in Doe (unlike that in Planned

Parenthood) referred to the constitutional rights of the doctors
themselves. Therefore, one should not consider Doe a third-party
standing case. Given Griswold and Eisenstadt, however, the implicit conclusion concerning the standing issue in Planned
Parenthood should not have been surprising; in any event, this
conclusion was explained by the plurality opinion in Planned
84
Parenthood'scompanion case, Singleton v. Wulff.

In Singleton, two physicians sued to challenge a Missouri statute excluding all abortions not "medically indicated" from the procedures for which Medicaid made its benefits available to needy
persons. The plaintiffs raised their own as well as their prospective
patients' constitutional rights. The district court dismissed for lack
of standing, but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.8 All of the Justices agreed that the doctors had article III
standing to raise their own rights, because the Medicaid funding
limitation resulted in a direct financial injury to them. The Justices disagreed, however, about whether the doctors had standing
to raise the rights of their prospective patients; this disagreement
produced by far the most extensive discussion of third-party
standing in which the Court has ever engaged.
Although the Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit on the standing issue, the debate apparently did not lead to a definitive resolution of the theoretical dispute among the Justices, since only Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White joined Mr. Justice Blackmun
in his plurality opinion on this point. Mr. Justice Stevens concurred in the result without offering any specific reasoning;8s the
82. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).

83. Id. at 188.
84. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
85. 508 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1978).
86. 428 U.S. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). Noting that the plaintiff physicians suffered injury in fact and raised constitutional arguments on their own behalf, Mr.
Justice Stevens made this brief statement: "Because these two facts are present, I agree that
the analysis in Part II-B of MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S opinion provides an adequate basis for
considering the arguments based on the effects of the statute on the constitutional rights of

their patients." Id. at 121-22. Being uncertain whether the Blackmun analysis would sustain
"the doctors' standing, apart from those two facts," he would not join the third-party standing section of Mr. Justice Blackmun's opinion. Id. at 122. This may or may not add up to
the novel suggestion that if a litigant has article III standing plus at least one argument
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other four Justices dissented.
After stating the basic rationale for the general rule,8 7 Mr. Jus-

tice Blackmun turned his attention to its exceptions:
Like any general rule, however, this one should not be applied
where its underlying justifications are absent. With this in mind,
the Couit has looked primarily to two factual elements to determine whether the rule should apply in a particular case. The
first is the relationship of the litigant to the person whose right
he seeks to assert. If the enjoyment of the right is inextricably
bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue, the
court at least can be sure that its construction of the right is not

unnecessary in the sense that the right's enjoyment will be unaffected by the outcome of the suit. Furthermore, the relationship
between the litigant and the third party may be such that the
former is fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the
right as the latter.88
As examples of cases involving this kind of relationship, Mr.
Justice Blackmun cited Griswold, Eisenstadt,Barrows, and Doe v.
Bolton.8s But, assuming a rightholder typically can assert his rights
more effectively than anyone else, why should a doctor-patient relationship, or any relationship other than a true fiduciary one, ensure advocacy as effective as that which the rightholder himself
would provide? Furthermore, is Mr. Justice Blackmun's statement
about the necessity of adjudication any different from requiring
simply that there be a real, as opposed to a hypothetical, victim of
the allegedly. unlawful conduct?
But Mr. Justice Blackmun did not stop there. "The other factual element to which the Court has looked," he continued,
is the ability of the third party to assert his own right. Even
where the relationship is close, the reasons for requiring persons
to assert their own rights will generally still apply. If there is
some genuine obstacle to such assertion, however, the third
party's absence from court loses its tendency to suggest that his
right is not truly at stake, or truly important to him, and the
party who is in court becomes by default the right's best availabased on a legal right of his own, a court may allow third-party standing, and that otherwise
it may not.
87. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
88. 428 U.S. at 114-15.
89. The further suggestion that Doe so closely resembles Singleton as to nearly "control" it, id. at 115, seems rather surprising in light of Doe's differences and total lack of
discussion of the third-party standing issue. See text accompanying notes 81-83 supra.
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ble proponent.90

To substantiate this proposition, he cited NAACP v. Alabama," Eisenstadt, and Barrows. Applying these principles to the
case at hand, the plurality of Justices found present the requisite

impact upon third-party rights and a sufficiently close relationship. 92 They also perceived sufficient obstacles to the pregnant woman's assertion of her own rights, specifically the threat of imminent mootness for any particular woman and the chilling effect of
publicity. Mr. Justice Blackmun recognized that these "obstacles"
were "not insurmountable," 9' 3 as Roe v. Wade9 4 had demonstrated,
so that ultimately the "obstacle" requirement apparently

amounted to nothing more than a mere "hurdle" requirement.
Mr. Justice Powell, in a dissent joined by three other Justices,
argued that past decisions permit third-party standing only when
"inall practicable terms" the victims cannot possibly assert their
own rights, 95 citing Barrows, NAACP v.Alabama, and Eisenstadt.
Mr. Justice Blackmun correctly refuted this sweeping statement,"
although he probably went too far as well, in claiming that the victims in all of the aforementioned cases could have asserted their
rights as plaintiffs in suits for injunctive or declaratory relief.9 7
Barrows presents perhaps the most compelling case for thirdparty representation. The black purchaser in that case probably
could not have challenged the validity of the racially restrictive
covenant in 1953, before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1968 and the discovery of section 1982 as a weapon against private
racial discrimination.s It would appear, however, that nothing pre90. 428 U.S. at 115-16.
91. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See text accompanying notes 178-83 infra.
92. Mr. Justice Blackmun pronounced the physician, generally, as "uniquely qualified
to litigate" the validity of laws bearing upon the availability of abortions. 428 U.S. at 117.
Presumably he did not intend this to be an additional requirement.
93. Id.
94. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the Court permitted the plaintiff, a pregnant woman
seeking an abortion, to use a pseudonym to maintain her anonymity. The case was saved
from mootness on appeal by the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" theory. See the
discussion of mootness at text accompanying notes 221-30, infra.
95. 428 U.S. at 126.
96. Id. at 116 n.6.
97. In the classic case of NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the Court viewed the
true victims as unable to assert their own rights. As Mr. Justice Blackmun stated, however,
it may not have been literally impossible for them to do so. 428 U.S. at 116 n.6.
98. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). At the time, only the theory of
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), allowed a federal attack on such private discrimination, and one could not invoke this theory unless the discriminating party had to resort to a
state court for enforcement of the covenant. Of course, the black buyer in Barrows did not
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vented the victims from suing for declaratory relief in cases such as
Eisenstadt," Griswold, Runyon, Pierce, and Buchanan.100
Mr. Justice Powell continued his argument in Singleton by rejecting the plurality's emphasis on the relationship between the litigant and the third party, and by offering a different basis for the
result in the doctor-patient cases:
The principle they support turns not upon the confidential nature of a physician-patient relationship but upon the nature of
the State's impact upon that relationship. In each instance the
State directly interdicted the normal functioning of the physician-patient relationship by criminalizing certain procedures. In
the circumstances of direct interference, I agree that one party
to the relationship should be permitted to assert the constitutional rights of the other, for a judicial rule of self-restraint
should not preclude an attack on a State's proscription of constitutionally protected activity. .

.

. But Missouri has not di-

rectly interfered with the abortion decision-neither the physicians nor their patients are forbidden to engage in the
procedure.101
Mr. Justice Powell referred not only to criminal prosecutions,
but to all cases involving criminal statutes, for he mentioned
Doe 0 2 and PlannedParenthood,0 8 and he included not only cases
involving close relationships, but Eisenstadt'" as well. 05 It seems,
then, that one can reduce his position to this: when a state says
that it shall be a crime for X to engage in a certain activity, and X
claims that this interferes with his relationship with Y and violates
Y's constitutional rights, X may assert Y's rights; but if the state
merely refuses to.provide funds for X to engage in that activity,
and X claims that this interferes with his relationship with Y and
really need any relief, having already purchased the house; the grant of third-party standing

to the white seller, then actually benefited not so much his purchaser as future potential
black purchasers facing similar obstacles. Furthermore, had the black purchaser faced legal
action at the hands of a neighbor-e.g., a suit to eject him under the covenant-he could
have utilized the Shelley theory in his defense.
99. Mr. Justice Powell apparently acknowledged that Eisenstadt might not support his
argument. 428 U.S. at 127 n.4.
100. In the circumstances of New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), an
early case in which the Court permitted employers to raise the rights of their employees, the
employee could have sued the employer on a negligence theory and challenged the validity
of the workmen's compensation statute when the railroad raised it as a defense.
101. 428 U.S. at 128-29.
102. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
103. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
104. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
105. 428 U.S. at 127 n.4.
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violates Y's constitutional rights, X may not assert Y's rights. One
may ask the factual question whether the state has as effectively
stopped X from engaging in the activity in the second case as in
the first; in Singleton, Mr. Justice Blackmun answered affirmatively.106 But even if one answers in the negative, what functional
purpose does the distinction serve, other than arbitrarily to narrow
the class of cases in which courts will grant third-party
07
standing?

1

3.

DEPARTURE FROM THE THEORY

Mr. Justice Powell closed his dissenting opinion in Singleton
with the prediction that the case "may well set a precedent that
will prove difficult to cabin."' 08 "No reason immediately comes to
mind, after today's holding, why any provider of services should be
denied standing to assert his client's or customer's constitutional
rights, if any, in an attack on a welfare statute that excludes from
coverage his particular transaction."' 0 His point seems well taken,
in view of the ease with which the plurality found "genuine obstacles" to victim-initiated litigation and the existence of a sufficiently close "relationship" to justify representation. Two cases decided the next term proved him right.
The Court faced the same issue only months later in Craig v.
Boren,"0 a case involving a challenge to the constitutionality of an
Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of "non-intoxicating" 3.2
percent beer to men under age twenty-one and women under eighteen. Two plaintiffs-a licensed vendor, and a man under twentyone at the time of filing suit-sued to enjoin enforcement of the
law, contending that it wrongfully discriminated against men. Because the young man had attained age twenty-one by the time the
case reached the Supreme Court, the case became moot as to him.
The Court therefore had to decide whether the vendor had standing to raise the rights of her prospective young male customers.
The Court held that she did, in a seven-to-two decision with only
the Chief Justice dissenting as to standing."'
106. Id. at 118 n.7.
107. For Mr. Justice Powell, the ultimate question seems to be whether the litigant
presents "a sufficiently compelling reason to justify departing from a rule of restraint that

well serves society and our judicial system." Id. at 131.
108. Id. at 129.

109. Id. at 129-30.
110. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

111. Id. at 215 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, did not question the vendor's standing under article III, because she faced a
choice between economic injury if she obeyed the law and "sanctions and perhaps loss of license" if she did not.' Turning to the
third-party standing question, he focused entirely on the effect
that the denial of standing to the vendor would have upon the prospective male vendees. The vendor, he wrote, "is entitled to assert
those concomitant rights of third parties that would be 'diluted or
adversely affected' should her constitutional challenge fail and the
statutes remain in force." 1 3 "Accordingly," he continued, citing
Eisenstadt, Sullivan, and Barrows, "vendors and those in like positions have been uniformly permitted to resist efforts at restricting their operations by acting as advocates of the rights of third
parties who seek access to their market or function."11 4 He reasoned that, since the law regulated the sale rather than the use of
3.2% beer, the vendor is "the obvious claimant."1 1 '
Aside from the reference to "vendors and those in like positions," the Court mentioned nothing about the requisite nature of
the relationship between litigant and victim. Nor did it refer to the
existence of any "obstacles" in the path of a vendee seeking to assert his own rights. Indeed, one vendee had joined as a plaintiff,
and, as the Court apparently recognized," 6 he could have overcome
the mootness problem by bringing a class action.11 7 The Court focused only on the claim of indirect impairment of the third party's
constitutional rights by virtue of the would-be litigant's compliance with the challenged law. Significantly, the Court distinguished United States v. Raines"' in a footnote: "The Raines rule
112. Id. at 194.
113. Id. at 195.
114. Id. Craig thus appears to have overruled Cronin v. Adams, 192 U.S. 108 (1904), a
case in which the Court denied a tavern owner standing to assert the rights of women in
challenging an ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquor in a saloon in which women were

present, although the decision does not clearly rest on that point. Craig also suggests that a
well-drafted complaint might now lead to a different result with respect to third-party
standing than in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In McGowan, retailers challenging a Sunday closing law could not raise free-exercise claims on behalf of their patrons.
"[S]ince appellants do not specifically allege that the statutes infringe upon the religious
beliefs of the department store's present or prospective patrons, we have no occasion here to
consider the standing question of Pierce v. Society of Sisters ....
" 366 U.S. at 429-30
(citation omitted).
115. 429 U.S. at 197.
116. Id. at 293 n.2.
117. See text accompanying notes 230-59 infra.

118. 362 U.S. 17 (1960). In Raines, the Attorney General brought suit against certain
public officials to enjoin them from interfering with the voting rights of blacks. The Court
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remains germane in such a setting, where the interests of the litigant and the rights of the proposed third parties are in no way
mutually interdependent."' 119
Curiously, only the Chief Justice, who deserves credit for consistency, dissented on the standing point, noting the absence of either factor stressed in Singleton.1 20 Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting on the merits, may have agreed; however, he specifically did
not discuss the standing issue.1" Mr. Justice Blackmun, the author
of the elaborate analysis in Singleton, concurred without mentioning standing. 12 2 Mr. Justice Stewart, who joined the Powell dissent
in Singleton, expressly concurred on the standing issue. 23 Mr. Justice Brennan raised another factor that may have been important,
although its effect is difficult to gauge. Apparently no party had
raised the issue of standing before either the district court or, although it is not clear from the opinion, the Supreme Court.1 2 4 In
this situation, wrote Mr. Justice Brennan, when the trial court has
already considered the merits of the claim, and no party has raised
any jurisdictional objection, the "prudential objectives" of the
third-party standing rule "cannot be furthered."12 5 Thus, Mr. Justice Brennan continued,
a decision by us to forgo consideration of the constitutional merits in order to await the initiation of a new challenge to the statute by injured third parties would be impermissibly to foster repetitive and time-consuming litigation under the guise of
caution and prudence. Moreover, insofar as the applicable constitutional questions have been and continue to be presented
vigorously and "cogently," . . . the denial of jus tertii standing
in deference to a direct class suit can serve no functional
purpose. 1 6
Consider the latter point first: the third-party standing rule
serves no purpose when there has been vigorous advocacy. But
what about the ostensible purposes of the general rule cited by Mr.
stated: "[Olne to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack
the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons
or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." Id. at 21.
119. 429 U.S. at 195 n.4.
120. Id. at 215-16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 217-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 214 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
123. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 193.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 193-94.
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Justice Blackmun in Singleton? In Craig, two of those purposes
were satisfied: the third party's rights were affected by what happened to the litigant, and it was clear that at least one member of
the third-party class supported the litigant's cause. But Mr. Justice Blackmun stated in Singleton that the third party generally,
will be the most effective advocate. Did it matter that in Craig a
member of the third-party class was effectively "present," even
though the Court found his interests moot? Or did Mr. Justice
Brennan's opinion suggest that, quite apart from its "exceptions,"
third-party standing will be permitted whenever it appears that
the litigant has vigorously and cogently argued the merits of the
case thus far? This suggestion ' has its appeal, but one should
note that it probably has no application to the Craig case, in which
a vendee, whose rights became technically irrelevant after the case
had become moot as to him, theoretically had provided effective
advocacy in the lower court.
What of the failure of anyone to raise the standing issue
before the case reached the Supreme Court? How does that situation differ, in terms of arguably wasted resources, from the situation in which the district court has ruled in favor of standing?
At any rate, one cannot know whether any of these factors
truly influenced the grant of third-party standing in Craig, but it
appears doubtful in light of the decision later that term in Carey v.
Population Services International.'s The litigant challenged a
New York law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen. The Court held that a corporation
engaged in the sale of contraceptives had standing to challenge the
law on behalf of its potential customers. Writing for the majority,
Mr. Justice Brennan briefly mentioned standing, and deemed
Craig controlling. 2 9 Again, the Court discussed only the effect
upon third parties. 80 In a footnote, however, the Court found the
case for third-party standing even more compelling than in Craig,
because the desire to avoid publicity might deter potential purchasers from asserting their own rights.' 8 ' Mr. Justice Powell expressly concurred on the standing issue,'8 2 apparently giving
127. The Supreme Court often has denied standing, despite a grant of standing and a
successful result on the merits for the litigant in the district court. E.g., Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
128. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
129. Id. at 683.
130. Id. at 684.
131. Id. n.4.
132. Id. at 703 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
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greater weight to the direct interference with a relationship than to
the absence of a genuine obstacle to litigation by the third parties
themselves. The two dissenters said nothing about standing.
The decisions in Craig and Carey suggest that the present
federal law of third-party standing may well coincide with the
view, held by some commentators, that courts should allow such
standing when denial of standing to the litigant would impair or
"dilute" the enjoyment of constitutional rights by a third party.1 83
One group of commentators has suggested that the Supreme Court
may be "approaching a general rule that either party to a relationship that is regulated or prohibited by statute has standing to raise
1 4
the rights of the other."

8

One must modify the latter suggestion, however, to take into
account the situation in which successful assertion of third-party
rights will not aid the litigant because the court finds it unnecessary to protect the litigant's interest in order to preserve the third
party's rights. The classic (and perhaps only) example at the Supreme Court level is United States v.Reidel.15 The federal government indicted Reidel for distributing obscene material through
the mail, in violation of a federal statute. He moved to dismiss,
alleging that the statute unconstitutionally impaired the rights of
consenting adults, recognized in the case of Stanley v.Georgia,8 6
133. "A practice of permitting claimants to assert jus tertii when the injury of which
they complain also deprives third parties of constitutional rights is necessary to ensure that
such rights are fully protected." Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88
HARV. L. REV. 423, 443 (1974). The actual recommendation by the author of that Note appears more complex than the quoted language from the author's concluding paragraph suggests. See id. at 431-35. See also The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV.L. REv. 47, 192
(1975): "Standing under this doctrine should be granted only when the claimant, if not relieved of a challenged legal obligation imposed on him or of the effects of such an obligation
imposed on others, will act in such a way as to deny third parties their constitutional
rights."
See also L. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 108:
[Wlhenever a denial of third-party standing to a derivately injured litigant (one
who is injured because of a legal duty imposed on a third party) can be shown
likely to impair the third party's enjoyment of an allegedly protected right,
standing should be granted and the allegations decided on the merits. A specific
relationship of interdependence between the litigant and the third party will
typically provide the causal link between derivative injury to the litigant and
impairment of the third party's rights; but the presence or absence of such a
relationship should not otherwise be relevant, nor should a relationship's "importance" or character matter for third-party standing except as it bears on the
causal link.
134. See, 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 61, § 3531, at 841 (Supp. 1980).
See also L. TRIBE, supra note 24, at 207, 210.
135. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
136. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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to possess obscene matter in their own homes. The district court
granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that "if a person has the
right to receive and possess this material, then someone must have
the right to deliver it to him.

13 7

The Supreme Court unanimously

reversed, stating: "The District Court gave Stanley too wide a
sweep. .

.

. Whatever the scope of the 'right to receive' referred to

in Stanley, it is not so broad as to immunize the dealings in obscenity in which Reidel engaged here .

. . .",8

In other words, the

trial judge's conclusion did not follow from the hypothesis established by Stanley. The consumer has a right to possess pornography and perhaps, in some undefined sense, to "receive" it.' But
this does not mean that anyone has the right to distribute it to
him. More significantly, the Court found that it need not protect
the rights of the distributor in order to protect the rights of the
consumer.
The relevant comparison is with Eisenstadt v. Baird,140 de4
' In Eisencided the following year, and Griswold v. Connecticut.1
stadt, however, the litigant, a distributor of contraceptives to single persons in violation of a state statute, argued only that the
statutory treatment of single persons, as opposed to married persons, denied single persons the equal protection of the law. If the
Court found the discrimination against the distributees improper,
then the distributor must be allowed to distribute contraceptives
to them. In Griswold, the litigants dispensed prescriptions for and
gave advice on contraceptives. They contended that the married
persons for whom they performed these services had a constitutional right to use contraceptives. The Court's decision that married persons did indeed have a right to use contraceptives might
not have embodied a further right to receive advice concerning and
prescriptions for such contraceptives; but the result in Griswold
makes clear that the decision did embody such a right and, further,
that the Court deemed it necessary to protect the interests of the
litigants in order to give full protection to the rights of those married persons.
In Reidel, to the contrary, the Court did not deem it necessary
137. Quoted at 402 U.S. at 355.
138. 402 U.S. at 355.
139. Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Stanley, referred to "the right to
receive information and ideas," along with the "right to be free. . . from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy," 394 U.S. at 564, but ultimately seemed to rest on the
"individual's right to read or observe what he pleases." Id. at 568.
140. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
141. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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to protect the interest of the distributor in order to protect the
recognized rights of the distributee. This may simply be another
way of saying that the Court took a more limited view of the constitutional protection enjoyed by the third-party rightholders in
Reidel than it did in Griswold. Thus, when a court can confidently
conclude, at the threshold of litigation, that protecting the rights
of third parties will not help protect the interests of the litigant,
the litigant cannot gain anything by asserting the third party's
142
rights, and thus lacks standing to assert them.
B. Implicit Grants of Third-Party Standing
The Supreme Court has permitted third-party standing sub
silentio on a number of occasions by resolving constitutional disputes with at least partial reliance upon rights of persons not parties before the Court. Meyer v. Nebraska'4" and Bartels v. Iowa 44
represent early and oft-cited examples of such judicial behavior.
Both cases involved convictions of teachers under state laws
prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in public schools. In
reversing these convictions and holding the statutes unconstitutional, the Court stated, in Meyer: "[The defendant's] right thus to
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their
children, we think, are within the liberty of the [fourteenth]
' 45
Amendment.'
More recently, Johnson v. Avery" held that a state could not
deprive prison inmates of legal assistance supplied by fellow inmates.' 47I The Court clearly based the decision on the rights of inmates who needed assistance, although the case had been brought
by an inmate who wished to provide legal assistance to others. The
Court did not address the standing issue.
142. One commentator suggests that "the scope of the substantive constitutional pro-

tection afforded to the third parties" bears upon the litigant's likelihood of success on the
merits rather than upon his standing. Note, supra, note 133, at 433. As the analysis in the
text indicates, I disagree.
143. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
144. 262 U.S. 404 (1923).

145. 262 U.S. at 400. The Court in Bartels simply reversed on the authority of Meyer.
Id. at 411.
146. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
147. Lower courts have followed Johnson on this point, recognizing the standing issue

but offering no attendant discussion beyond a reference to Johnson. McDonald v. Hall, 610
F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979); Haymes v. Montanye, 547 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 967 (1977). However, lower courts have not permitted third-party standing

in this context with respect to a claim for damages. Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223 (7th Cir.
1978).
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Maness v. Meyers

provides another example of the Court's

silent avoidance of the standing problem. The lower court held an
attorney in contempt for advising his client, a trial witness, to refuse to respond to a subpoena duces tecum on fifth amendment
grounds. The Supreme Court held that the attorney, acting in good
faith, could not be held in contempt under these circumstances,
because to do so would impair the client's enjoyment of his fifth
amendment rights. One should keep in mind that the attorney was
the litigant in the contempt proceeding.
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 4a the Supreme Court affirmed a
district court opinion that addressed the standing question. A widower challenged provisions of the federal Social Security Act providing widows, but not widowers, with Social Security benefits following the death of the claimant's spouse. Wiesenfeld, a widower,
wished to argue that the statutory scheme denied equal protection
to female wage earners as well as to widowers. The district court
addressed itself expressly to that issue, permitting the widower
standing to assert the rights of women "because no other plaintiff
could, present a claim similar to hers [Wiesenfeld's wife] in a case
ripe for adjudication" under the statute. 5 0 The Supreme Court, affirming the district court, apparently based the decision upon the
equal protection rights of men and women, but the Court said
nothing about Wiesenfeld's standing.
One may justify all of these decisions under a liberal application of the "relationship" and "obstacle" exceptions discussed in
Singleton,'5 ' and probably one can explain each of them under the
"dilution" theory later employed by Craig and Carey. Interestingly, the Court evidently viewed the standing issue in the cases
discussed in this section as neither troubling nor significant enough
to warrant explicit attention in its opinions, even though standing
1 52
is a "jurisdictional" issue that the Court often raises on its own.
148. 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
149. 420 U.S. 636 (1975), aff'g 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973).
150. 367 F. Supp. at 989, n.25 (apparently suggesting that a woman, during her lifetime,
could not have a concrete controversy with HEW under the statute).
151. Johnson and Wiesenfeld have weaknesses with the "relationship" factor, while
Maness and Meyer have weaknesses with the "obstacle" factor.
152. See, e.g., Or v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979). Also, Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), may have implicitly permitted third-party standing. Mr. Justice

Brennan, in dissent, stated that the majority considered only the rights of tenants in rejecting a challenge to a restrictive zoning ordinance originally brought by tenants and landlords, but which had become moot as to the plaintiff tenants. Id. at 10. One has difficulty
discerning from the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas whether Mr. Justice Brennan
accurately characterized the majority's discussion.
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C. Conflict: Warth v. Seldin
A single Supreme Court decision-Warth v. Seldin'lsharply conflicts with the liberality of the third-party standing decisions of the past decade. Regarded by many as one of the Court's
54
most unreasonably restrictive decisions on article III standing,1
Warth involved a challenge to a zoning ordinance of Penfield, New
York, a suburb of Rochester, on the ground that the restrictive ordinance had the purpose and effect of excluding persons of low and
moderate income from residing in the town. A variety of plaintiffs
brought suit; the Court denied standing to every one of them. The
harshest and most crucial aspect of the opinion involved the denial
of standing to the individually named low-income residents of
Rochester who alleged that the zoning ordinance excluded them
from residing in Penfield. The Court denied them standing, based
on the individuals' failure to demonstrate in the record that if the
ordinance were struck down, any builder would in fact build lowcost housing at prices that these plaintiffs could afford. Another
group of plaintiffs, Rochester taxpayers, alleged that the Penfield
ordinance caused the construction of more low-income housing in
Rochester-and thus higher taxes-than would ensue if the ordinance did not exist. The Court found the injury to the taxpayers
"conjectural" and the alleged line of causation tenuous. 155 But,
wrote Mr. Justice Powell, even if the Court assumed the requisite
injury and causation for these taxpayers, this would not entitle
them to raise the rights of the low-income persons allegedly excluded from Penfield, and the taxpayers concededly raised no legal
claims on their own behalf. 1" Mr. Justice Powell quickly reviewed
the precedents and observed that in Warth the record did not reveal a special relationship or an adverse effect upon a special relationship, nor was third-party standing "necessary to insure protection of the rights asserted, as there is no indication that persons
who in fact have been excluded from Penfield are disabled from
15 7
asserting their own right in a proper case.
153. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
154. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 7, at 399-401; Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated:
Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARv. L. REv. 1373,
1382-92 (1978); Sedler, supra note 7, at 873; The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, supra note
117, at 190-91; Note, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Land Use Devices in Federal
Courts After Warth v. Seldin, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 323, 345-49 (1977).

155. 422 U.S. at 509.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 510. Third-party standing could also have been asserted, and without the
added problem of causation, by Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc., an association 9% of whose
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But as later cases have shown, the Court does not necessarily
require either a meaningful relationship, or helplessness on the victim's part, for third-party standing.1 5 8 In Warth, at least some people who perceived themselves as direct victims could not assert
their own rights. Furthermore, they supported the cause, perceived
themselves as having a personal stake, and undoubtedly would
have voiced their "views" as amici curiae. Assuming injury in fact
and causation for the sake of argument, as the Court did, there was
no good reason to deny these taxpayers third-party standing, unless the Court believed that there were no real victims of the zoning ordinance. Certainly, there were victims of the assertedly unconstitutional ordinance (whether or not they included the named

plaintiffs) who would gain by the plaintiffs' victory and would continue to suffer if the plaintiffs lost.
The discussion thus far has emphasized the similarities between Warth and the other recent cases on third-party standing
and suggests that the Court, by its own standards of the late
1970's, may have decided Warth incorrectly on this point. But in
all fairness, one can distinguish Warth. In virtually all of the other
cases a relationship had arisen between litigants and victims such
that, regardless of the importance or casualness of the relationship
members resided in Penfield and allegedly suffered deprivation of "the benefits of living in a
racially and ethnically integrated community." Id. at 512. Because the association would
clearly have standing if its members did, see notes 176-89 and accompanying text infra, the
question became whether these Penfield residents had standing. The Court said "no" for
two reasons: First, the Court suggested (without concluding) that this alleged deprivation
did not satisfy the requirements of article III, notwithstanding the opinion in Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). In Trafficante, the Court found that the
Civil Rights Act of 1968 conferred upon white residents of segregated housing an actionable
right to be free from the adverse consequences of segregation as to them. No such statute
existed here. Justice Powell noted, "Congress may create a statutory right or entitlement
the alleged deprivation of which can confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff would
have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute." 422 U.S. at 514. It is
unclear how Congress could have the power to supersede or minimize the supposed article
III requirement of "injury in fact." The statute in Trafficante eliminated any third-party
standing issue, but if the Court found article III satisfied, presumably it felt that plaintiffs
suffered an actual loss, identical to the one suffered by the Penfield residents in Warth. But
even assuming article III standing, the Court found a second reason to deny standing to this
organizational plaintiff: the rule against third-party standing, with none of the exceptions to
the rule present. Id.
The would-be intervenor, Rochester Home Builders Association, constituted another
possible litigant on behalf of third parties. The Court denied standing for the same reasons
it denied standing to the alleged victims themselves: inadequate allegations (in the Court's
view) of causation of injury. Id. at 516.
The four dissenting Justices did not discuss the third-party standing issue.
158. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:393

for any other purpose, the victims would suffer (i.e., their rights
would be "diluted") if those in the litigant's position complied with
the challenged law. Thus, if the white seller abided by the covenant or ordinance, the black buyer would suffer;"'9 if the private
school closed, the students and their parents would suffer;' e0 if the
doctor would not perform the abortion, the patient would suffer;'"1
and if the distributor or vendor did not distribute or sell, the distributee or vendee would suffer. 62 Warth presented a different situation, one in which any extra-judicial conduct by the taxpayerplaintiffs would have no effect on the low-income persons. But
what purpose does the rule serve by requiring such a relationship
of litigant to victim, other than narrowing the availability of thirdparty standing? As we have seen, the existence of such a relationship has nothing to do with the ability of the victim to assert his
own rights, nor (as Warth demonstrates) does the absence of such
a relationship mean that the third-party victim will not benefit
from the grant of standing to the litigant. Furthermore, there is no
reason to link the "dilution" theory to the quality of advocacy one
can expect from the litigant. The "dilution" exception apparently
created by the Craig and Carey decisions represents a salutary extension of the availability of third-party standing in the federal
courts. Because it remains an exception to an unnecessary general
rule, however, it does not go far enough.
IV.

RELATED CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT

A thorough exploration of the law of third-party standing
must encompass a reference to several categories of cases in which
the third-party standing issue appears to be raised, but does not
actually play a part in the decision, given the Court's definition of
the rights of the litigant. There are at least four lines of such cases.
159. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
160. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
161. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976).
162. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (involving the legality of a doctor advising a patient with respect to the use of
contraceptives). Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943), involved a similar relationship and
"dilution" of rights, and it seems safe to say that the Court would decide the case differently
today, notwithstanding the distinction noted in Griswold between criminal and civil cases in
which the issue of third-party standing is raised. See Mr. Justice Brennan's more recent
comment in Craig, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), concerning the insignificance of "the litigative posture of the suit." Id. at 196 n.5.
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The first group comprises cases on the right of a criminal defendant to be tried by a jury selected in a non-discriminatory fashion.
The second group consists of cases that contemplate the recentlyarticulated first amendment right to receive information. The third
group embraces cases in which Congress has conferred a statutory
cause of action on one who otherwise would lack standing to sue.
The fourth group entails cases in which an association seeks access
to courts on behalf of its members.
A.

Systematic Exclusion of Blacks from Jury

In Peters v. Kiff,1 3 a white defendant claimed that blacks
were systematically excluded from both the grand jury that indicted him and the petit jury that convicted him. The Court held
that he had standing to raise this challenge. Mr. Justice Marshall,
writing for only three Justices, stated the essence of his rationale:
"IT]he Court has also recognized that the exclusion of a discernible class from jury service injures not only those defendants who
belong to the excluded class, but other defendants as well, in that
it destroys the possibility that the jury will reflect a representative

cross section of the community. "164
Thus, three Justices appeared to be saying that a white defendant's right to due process of law includes a right to trial by a jury
selected under a system that does not discriminate against blacks.
Viewed that way, the defendant raised no legal rights other than
his own, although his own rights clearly overlapped with those of
black citizens generally. Mr. Justice White, writing for a second
group of three justices, concurred in the result.' 5 The basis of his
response to the standing question is somewhat unclear; possibly he
subordinated the concerns of standing to the more compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination in the selection of jurors. 6 6
163. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
164. Id. at 500.

165. Id. at 505. Chief Justice Burger dissented, for a third group of three Justices. Id. at
507. The standing issue was one of his concerns. See also Otero v. Mesa County Valley Sch.
Dist. No. 51, 568 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1977), in which Mexican-American students objected

to discrimination in the assignment of Mexican-American teachers in public schools. The
court appeared to view the alleged discrimination against the teachers as violative of the
rights of the students.
166. It is. . .true that there is no case in this Court setting aside a conviction for
arbitrary exclusions of a class of citizens from jury service where the defendant
was not a member of the excluded class. I also recognize that, as in this case, the
courts of appeal reflecting the generally accepted constitutional view, have rejected claims such as petitioner presents here. [However], I would implement the
strong statutory policy . . . which reflects the central concern of the Fourteenth
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167
the entire Court
Three terms later, in Taylor v. Louisiana,
apparently adopted Mr. Justice Marshall's theory in Peters. Taylor, a male, successfully appealed from a state kidnapping conviction by showing that the state's jury-selection system improperly
discriminated against women. The Court quickly rejected the
state's challenge to Taylor's standing to raise this argument, citing
Peters.' The Court reaffirmed this approach by entertaining a
similar challenge in 1979, in Duren v. Missouri,6 9 without even
discussing the question of standing.

B.

First Amendment Right to Receive Information

In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 70 the Court held that consumers had standing
to challenge a governmental ban on advertising by pharmacists. Although it might appear that the plaintiffs were asserting the first
amendment rights of pharmacists to advertise, the Court made it
clear that "the protection afforded is to the communication, to its

source and to its recipients both.''

Thus, as in the jury discrimi-

Amendment with racial discrimination, by permitting petitioner to challenge his
conviction.
407 U.S. at 506-07 (White, J., concurring).
167. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
168. Id. at 526.
169. 439 U.S. 357 (1979). Mr. Justice Rehnquist, howe ,er, raised questions, in dissent,
as to whose rights the Court really allowed the male defendant to raise. Id. at 371.
See also United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977), involving a white
defendant's attempt to argue, on appeal from his conviction, that the prosecutor had improperly used his peremptory challenges to exclude all potential black jurors from defendant's jury. The court allowed the defendant to make this argument, but treated the case as
a true third-party standing case.
A case in which the rights raised by the litigants probably should have been treated as
their own is Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919). In Blair, the trial court held in civil
contempt two witnesses subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury, for refusing to
testify; the Supreme Court in a habeas corpus suit did not allow the witnesses to challenge
the jurisdiction of the grand jury to inquire into the particular subject matter of its inquiry.
The Court found it "no concern of one summoned as a witness whether the offense is within
the jurisdiction of the court or not." Id. at 282. This aspect of the case, which suggests that
the Court perceived the issue as one of third-party standing, seems wrong. The jurisdictional question is the witness' concern for his sake; one can view the jurisdiction of the
grand jury as jurisdiction over the witness as well as jurisdiction with respect to the one
ultimately indicted (if, indeed anyone is indicted). The Court, however, may in essence have
spoken to the merits of this controversy by pointing out that the court and grand jury "have
authority and jurisdiction to investigate the facts in order to determine the question
whether the facts show a case within their jurisdiction." Id. at 283.
170. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
171. Id. at 756. See also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972), and cases
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nation cases, the litigants had raised no legal rights other than
their own.
Closely related to this line of cases, but arguably sui generis, is
Procunier v. Martinez,17 1 in which state prisoners challenged the
constitutionality of regulations relating to the censorship of mail
between prisoners and outsiders. Avoiding the contention that
prisoners' interests receive less first amendment protection than
the interests of nonprisoners, Mr. Justice Powell pointed out that
those who correspond with prisoners have protected interests in
those communications as well, and that clearly these "outside" correspondents enjoy no second-class constitutional status. In the process of explaining the interests involved, Mr. Justice Powell stated:
"We do not deal here with difficult questions of the so-called 'right
to hear' and third-party standing but with a particular means of
communication in which the interests of both parties are inextrica8
bly meshed.

1' 7

Despite this disclaimer, however, the Court permitted the
plaintiff prisoners to assert the rights of their correspondents.
What makes this case arguably unique is that the Court deliberately sidestepped the question whether the rights of the thirdparty correspondents were greater than, or co-extensive with, the
rights of the plaintiffs. Thus, possibly the plaintiffs did not assert
any rights except their own; arguably they did not, and one can
view the Court's discussion of the rights of third parties as nothing
more than a reminder that this case implicated such other rights,
thus obviating the need to define the full scope of the plaintiffs'
rights.
C. Statutory Standing
Congress has eliminated the third-party standing problem in
some situations by creating a statutory cause of action for a liticited therein. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980) (newspaper
asserted both its right and public's right of access to criminal trial). See generally Emerson,

Legal Foundationsof the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Note, The Right to Know in
First Amendment Analysis, 57 TEx. L. REv.505 (1979).
Although at least one lower court has stated that "the recognition of standing to assert
the right to hear is fundamentally analagous to a grant of standing to assert the rights of a
third party and ought, perhaps, to be governed by similar prudential restrictions," Frissell v.
Rizzo, 597 F.2d 840, 848 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1979), the Supreme Court has
never adopted this position and it would be strange indeed if the courts placed restrictions
on the assertion of a constitutional right by the rightholder himself.
172. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
173. Id. at 409.
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gant who would otherwise lack standing to sue, when the litigant
appears to be vindicating the rights of third parties. In Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,1 74 two apartment complex te-

nants-one white, one black-sued the owner of the complex
under the Civil, Rights Act of 1968, alleging discrimination against
nonwhites and resultant intangible injuries to themselves. The
statute provides a cause of action for any "person aggrieved" by
words
racial discrimination; finding that Congress intended these
1
to have broad application, the Court granted standing. 71
D. Associational Standing
The Supreme Court also has made it clear that, as a general
rule, an association has standing to assert the rights of its members, provided that at least some of its members176 have suffered or
presently suffer injury as a consequence of the governmental ac1 77
tion challenged. The Court has applied this principle frequently.
The decisions evidence a strong but superficial resemblance to
third-party standing cases, notwithstanding the Court's treatment
of an early case on associational standing as a case on third-party
standing.
In NAACP v. Alabama,"8 the state subpoenaed an association's membership lists; the association resisted the attempt to
compel disclosure of its membership, asserting the members' first
amendment rights of association for political purposes. In response
to a challenge to the association's standing, the Court observed
that it may permit representatives to argue on behalf of absent
174. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).

175. Id. at 209. See also Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979). Related
to these cases are those in which a litigant has been permitted to challenge administrative
action, under a statute allowing any "aggrieved" person to do so, on any and all grounds, in
order to vindicate the public interest. E.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470 (1940). See generally Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis,
86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 654-58 (1973).
176. According to dictum in Warth v. Seldin, injury to only a single member of the
association will suffice. 422 U.S. at 511. Accord, River v. Richmond Metro. Auth., 359 F.
Supp. 611, 625 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973). At least one lower court
decision appears to contradict this, however, holding that a union could not join with one of
its members as plaintiffs in an action for injunctive relief when the individual member suffered injury unique to herself. Boyce v. Rizzo, 78 F.R.D. 698, 704-06 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
177. E.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 299 n.11 (1979); Boston Stock
Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n., 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3 (1977); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 739 (1972); National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n. v. United States, 372 U.S. 246 (1963).
No doubt exists that an association has standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from
injury to itself as an entity, asserting its own legal rights. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 511.
178. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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rightholders whose rights otherwise "could not be effectively vindicated,"'17 9 citing Barrows v. Jackson.180 The Court concluded that
to require the members to assert their own rights "would result in
nullification of the right at the very moment of its assertion. Petitioner is the appropriate party to assert these rights, because it
and its members are in every practical sense identical."181 The
Court recognized that the association itself might well suffer injury
if it could not litigate this action; thus, it had standing to assert its
members' rights.
By the mid-1970's, the analysis in NAACP v. Alabama had
become unnecessary, save for the characterization ° of the association and its members as "identical." By then there was general
agreement that, as Mr. Justice Powell stated in Warth v. Seldin,
"[e]ven in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have
standing solely as the representative of its members. ' '1SS He
continued:
The association must allege that its members, or any one of
them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of
the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit .... So long

as this can be established, and so long as the nature of the claim
and of the relief sought does not make the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of
the cause, the association may be an appropriate representative
of its members, entitled to invoke the court's jurisdiction. '
In Warth, one of the associations seeking intervention in the action sought damages, but claimed no injury to itself as an entity.
The Court denied this association standing to seek such relief,
since the monetary claims of its members were unequal and would
179. Id. at 459.

180. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
181. 357 U.S. at 459.
182. 422 U.S. at 511. Surprisingly, at least a few lower courts appear to have the mistaken impression that representative associational standing depends, as it apparently did in
1958, upon a showing that the members face an obstacle in the assertion of their own rights.
See, e.g., Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 1973);

Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 455 F. Supp. 420 (M.D. Fla. 1978), af'd, 638 F.2d 1272
(5th Cir. 1981) (Fifth Circuit, however, correctly overruled district court on representational
standing question); Let's Help Fla. v. Smathers, 453 F. Supp. 1003, 1006-07 (N.D. Fla.
1978); Boyce v. Rizzo, 78 F.R.D. 698, 704-06 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See also Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 573 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933
(1976). Possibly these courts do not realize that later cases, such as Warth, superseded
NAACP on this issue.
183. 422 U.S. at 511.
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require individualized proof. Contrasting an action seeking purely
prospective relief, Mr. Justice Powell found that this situation required each member to be a party to the suit.""
Cases on associational standing clearly resemble the thirdparty standing cases in that, as in third-party cases, the court permits one legal "person" to assert the rights of another. The resemblance is superficial, however, because the association-litigant, in a
very real sense, personifies the very third parties whose rights it
asserts-its members. In theory, at least, the members govern a
membership association through the process of democratic election
of its leaders. The association represents the members generally,
not merely in litigation, with respect to the issues or concerns that
led to their organization. Allowing standing in such circumstances
is therefore perfectly appropriate, at least when, as the Supreme
Court further requires, the interests the association seeks to protect "are germane to the organization's purpose."'1 8 5 The result in
no way offends the policy concerns that ostensibly underlie the
rule against third-party standing, because the rights of the members are being advocated by their chosen representatives in a cause
184. Id. at 515-16. Accord, United Steel Workers v. University of Ala., 599 F.2d 56 (5th
Cir. 1979); Local 194, Retail, Wholesale, & Dep't Store Union v. Standard Brands, Inc., 540
F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1976). But see Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. United States, 525
F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1975).
The courts have not applied the "indispensable party" exception to associational standing solely in cases in which plaintiff sought damages. In Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671
(1980), the Court held that an organizational plaintiff, seeking to enjoin enforcement of a
public funding restriction for abortions, lacked standing under the free exercise clause of the
first amendment to challenge the restriction. Mr. Justice Stewart wrote: "Since it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates
against him in the practice of his religion . . ., the claim asserted here is one that ordinarily
requires individual participation." Id. at 2690 (footnote omitted). See also Associated Gen.
Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co., 611 F.2d 684, 691 (8th Cir. 1979). But see Church of
Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272, 1280 (5th Cir. 1981).
185. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). As
one district court has said, "the association's representative capacity will seldom, if ever,
extend to all of its members' interests. . . .It is necessary, therefore, to assess the interest
asserted to be sure that it is one that the claimant can properly assert as a true representative." Boyce v. Rizzo, 78 F.R.D. 698, 704 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Another court has observed:
This requirement helps insure, not only that the party before the Court be a
competent and effective advocate on the issues presented, but also that the
members of the plaintiff organization have an opportunity to influence their representatives on positions related to the particularmember injury at issue. Like
the membership requirement discussed above, this too ultimately insures that it
is the injured party, and not merely a well-intentioned advocate, who is, at least
in effect, before the Court.
Health Research Group v. Kennedy, 82 F.R.D. 21, 28 (D.D.C. 1979).
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which the members presumably support. 8' 6 The Supreme Court
has extended the associational-standing doctrine to an organization that is not a traditional voluntary membership association, so
long as those whom the organization purports to represent possess
"all of the indicia of membership in an organization,"1 "' thus satis-

fying the policies underlying the associational-standing doctrine.
The Court found such a situation in Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Commission, "

in which the Court granted

standing to a state commission elected and financed by, and composed of, apple growers and dealers in the state. "In a very real
sense, therefore," wrote the Chief Justice, "the Commission repre-

sents the State's growers and dealers and provides the means by
which they express their collective views and protect their collective interests. ' 'lsS
V.

THIRD-PARTY STANDING DECISIONS IN THE LOWER FEDERAL
COURTS

A thorough inquiry into the viability and wisdom of the present law of third-party standing must encompass a study of the
pertinent decisions of the lower federal courts during the past decade, a period in which the federal judiciary devoted more energy
than ever before to the evaluation and explanation of this doctrine.
There have been many such decisions during the last ten years,
186. Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of internal dissension within the association with respect to support for the lawsuit, some lower courts
have indicated that the existence of such dissension may supply adequate reason to deny
associational standing. In NCAA v. Califano, 622 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1980), the court allowed associational standing only upon an affirmative showing that at least one member
supported the lawsuit and the absence of any indication that a majority of members opposed it. See also Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds,
424 U.S. 902 (1976), denying standing to an organization whose members would most likely
be divided by the issues and relief sought in the action. But see Rhode Island Chapter,
Assoc'd Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338, 346 n.3 (D.R.I. 1978), suggesting
that a conflict of interests among its membership would not affect an association's standing.
See generally Note, Associational Standing and Due Process: The Need for an Adequate Representation Scrutiny, 61 B.U.L. REV. 174 (1981), in which the author urges the
federal courts to allow associational standing only upon a threshold showing of the likelihood of adequate representation of the interests of members of the association.
187. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 344 (1977).
188. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
189. Id. at 345. See also Health Research Group v. Kennedy, 82 F.R.D. 21 (D.D.C.
1979), denying standing to a non-membership organization which the court found lacking in
sufficient "indicia of membership." For a debate over the wisdom of the result, see
Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy"
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 319 (1979) and Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1703.
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with a predictable variation of results ranging from excessive liberality to undue restrictiveness. The results have usually been satisfying, but the reasoning frequently has not.
A.

Decisions Granting Standing

Many of the decisions have allowed third-party standing, often
on the basis of a liberal application of Supreme Court precedents.
Some courts, for example, have granted standing purely on the basis of the "relationship" exception stated in Singleton, although
noting that denial of standing would impair the rights of third parties.19 0 Others have permitted standing solely on the basis of the
second factor discussed in Singleton-a perceived obstacle to the
third party's assertion of his own rights."19 In more complete harmony with the. plurality opinion in Singleton, at least one court
has required the presence of both factors for standing."e ' A few
courts have looked only to the impact upon third-party rights, requiring no pre-existing or established relationship." a3 Still other
190. Planned Parenthood v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861, 865 n.3 (8th
Cir. 1977) (abortion clinic asserting rights of female patients); In re Investigation before
April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 606 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (attorney, as litigant, asserting right of client to have attorney of his choice); Walgren v. Board of Selectmen, 519 F.2d
1364, 1364 n.1 (lst Cir. 1975) (candidate asserting rights of voters); Wounded Knee Legal
Defense/Offense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1974) (attorneys, as litigants,
asserting rights of clients in challenging FBI harrassment of attorneys); Mancuso v. Taft,
476 F.2d 187, 190 (1st Cir. 1973) (candidate asserting rights of voters); Keker v. Procunier,
398 F. Supp. 756, 764-65 (E.D. Cal. 1975) (attorney, as litigant, asserting rights of client);
Henrie v. Derryberry, 358 F. Supp. 719, 722 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (psychologist, psychiatrist,
and minister asserting rights of females who consult them concerning abortions). One court
stressed the relationship between the litigant and third parties, and found the third parties'
rights "inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue. .. ." Czajkowski v. Illinois, 460 F. Supp. 1265, 1274-76 (N.D. Ill. 1977), aff'd without opinion, 588 F.2d
839 (7th Cir. 1978) (cigarette retailer asserting fourth amendment rights of purchasers).
191. Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942
(1979) (employer asserting rights of employees in opposing NLRB certification of union);
United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977) (black and white criminal defendants asserting rights of black citizens in challenging exclusion of black jurors through
use of peremptory challenges by prosecutor).
192. Francis v. Cleland, 433 F. Supp. 605 (D.S.D. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Cleland v. National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213 (1978) (educational institution
asserting rights of veteran-students in challenge to statutory provisions concerning educational benefits). See also Akron Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 1285, 1289-91
(6th Cir. 1974).
193. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029, 1036 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3851 (U.S. May 19, 1981) (No. 80-1577) (amusement center owner
asserting rights of children under 17 to play coin-operated amusement machines); Wilson v.
Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1367 (D. Or. 1976) (teacher asserting rights of communist
speaker whom teacher invited to speak to his class); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v.
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courts have taken a pragmatic approach to the question, allowing
standing not through application of any of the Supreme Court's
exceptions, but because the facts of the case satisfied the policies
underlying the general rule. 194 In several other cases, most of them
pre-dating the elaborate Singleton debate, courts permitted thirdparty standing on the basis of very questionable reasoning, given

the Supreme Court precedents controlling at the time. 9 '
Another line of cases evolved from the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education v. Allen. 9 6 In that case, a local board

of education challenged the constitutionality of a New York law
requiring local public school authorities to lend textbooks to students in private as well as in public schools. Although no party
challenged the board's standing at the Supreme Court level, Mr.
Justice White stated that there was "no doubt" that it had standing, given that the board members would have to choose between
violating the statute, thus risking dismissal from office, or violating
Kleindienst, 364 F. Supp. 719, 723-25 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (newspaper asserting rights of prisoners in challenge to policy preventing prison interviews). See also United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 574 (3d Cir. 1980) (employer may assert employees' right
to privacy). In Westinghouse, the court apparently focused upon the dilution of third-party
rights, but noted as well the existence of an "ongoing relationship" between employer and
employees. The same conclusion was reached in United States v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 498
F. Supp. 1027 (E.D. Wisc. 1980), with no apparent consideration of the established exception to the general rule.
194. Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1060-63 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827
(1979) (plaintiff an "appropriate party" to raise issues in question, given plaintiff's role in
statutory scheme in question); Southwestern Community Action Council, Inc. v. Community
Servs. Admin'n, 462 F. Supp. 289, 292-94 (S.D. W. Va. 1978) (corporation may assert rights
of chairman of its board, since action will involve chairman). See also Chadha v. INS, 634
F.2d 408, 418 (9th Cir. 1980), where the court succinctly rejected a jus tertii objection to a
claim based upon a separation of powers argument.
195. Chicano Police Officers' Ass'n v. Stover, 526 F.2d 431, 435 (10th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 944 (1976); Gajon Bar & Grill, Inc. v. Kelly, 508 F.2d 1317,
1322 n.9 (2d Cir. 1974); Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th
Cir. 1972); Doe v. Temple, 409 F. Supp. 899, 903 (E.D. Va. 1976); Stoner v. Fortson, 379 F.
Supp. 704, 707 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Stoner v. Fortson, 359 F. Supp. 579, 580-81 (N.D. Ga. 1972);
Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston, 355 F. Supp. 396, 400-02 (N.D. Ill. 1971). In
Spinkellink (sic) v. Wainright, 578 F.2d 582, 612 n.36 (5th Cir. 1978), the court permitted a
condemned murderer to challenge the death penalty by arguing, inter alia, that the penalty
applied disproportionately to the killers of white persons, thus discriminating against black
people. The litigant was white. The court said, on the issue of standing: "Spenkelink has
standing to raise the equal protection issue, even though he is not a member of the class
allegedly discriminated against, because such discrimination, if proven, impinges on his constitutional right. . . not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment," citing Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975), described supra at text accompanying note 167. While
one can understand the court's solicitous attitude toward a person in Spenkelink's position,
the reasoning lacks clarity.
196. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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(in their minds, at least) their oath to support the Federal Constitution.197 The Allen holding actually represents, at best, an exception to the general rule, articulated by the Court six years later,
that no person has standing to challenge governmental action that
causes him no individualized injury but simply offends his sense of
justice.'"a
One should also note that the Court has been liberal in permitting challenges to legislation under the establishment clause of
the first amendment, so long as the challenger has suffered actual
injury caused by the legislation." 9 Allen allowed an establishment
clause challenge by public officials on the basis of the "injury"
caused them through the imposition of a choice between two unpalatable alternatives.2 00 Although Allen had nothing to do with
third-party standing, at least a few lower courts have relied on its
holding to permit public officials to bring actions in which they
asserted the rights of third parties 210
197. Id. at 241 n.5.
198. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). At least one lower court has held that the Allen
rationale did not survive these later decisions. City of S. Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1980).
199. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-31 (1961). Cf. Harris v. McRae, 100 S.
Ct. 2671 (1980) (indigent pregnant women, officers of women's division of church organization, and organization itself denied standing to challenge curtailment of funds for abortions
under free exercise clause of first amendment, for failure to allege personal stake in
controversy).
200. The Supreme Court, in earlier cases, however, held that a public official had standing to sue based simply upon the "injury" suffered by virtue of impairment of his ability to
perform his official duties. United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345
U.S. 153 (1953); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). See also Brewer v. Hoxie School
Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91, 95 (8th Cir. 1956); Washington Utils. & Trans. Comm'n v. FCC,
513 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
201. Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434
U.S. 978 (1977); Akron Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 1285 (6th Cir.) (alternative ground), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1100
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Aguayo v. Weinberger, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974). In some
of these cases, the court recognized that the litigant arguably raised a third-party standing
issue, but treated the "official duty" theory as an entirely independent basis for standing. In
Regents, for example, the plaintiffs challenged NCAA sanctions placed upon the university
as a result of plaintiffs' failure to declare three basketball players ineligible for participation
in intercollegiate competition. The plaintiff officials argued that the athletes had a constitutional right to a prior hearing, and that the defendant NCAA's actions interfered with the
plaintiffs' performance of their constitutional duties. The court rejected the argument that
the plaintiffs violated the rule against third-party standing, stating: "It is true of course,
that plaintiffs here seek to assert the rights of student-athletes Thompson, Winey and
Saunders. As our above comments make clear, however, their attempt to do so forms an
integral part of their attempt to assert their own constitutional right." 560 F.2d at 364.
Although the court stated earlier that the plaintiffs had a right to freedom from interference
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B.

Decisions Denying Standing

There have also been many lower court cases denying thirdparty standing, most of them quite properly. At the lower-court
level, constitutional challenges to statutes on the basis of overbreadth, outside the first amendment context, continue to be
brought and rejected.20
Challenges to statutes on vagueness
grounds have been similarly rejected if the court found the statute

clearly covered the litigant's conduct and thus was not vague as to
him.208 Other lower court cases have been decided on, or can be
explained by, the severability and causation principles discussed

earlier.20 4 Finally, the courts in many cases have properly denied
with the performance of their constitutional duties, id. at 363, it arrived at an incorrect
ultimate conclusion. The violation of that "right" may constitute plaintiffs' "injury in fact,"
but surely one cannot say that these plaintiffs had a constitutional right to provide the
three athletes with a prior hearing, in the same sense that one can say that a white criminal
defendant has a right to a jury chosen freely of racial discrimination. See text accompanying
notes 163-69 supra. Clearly the plaintiffs in Regents asserted rights other than their own, in
the process of asserting their own "rights."
In the Akron case the court noted that the plaintiff local board's members might face
liability in a later suit, at the hands of third parties, if the local board acquiesced in the
challenged action of the state board. 490 F.2d at 1290. This case relates closely to International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 (1944) and Anderson
Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944). In each of these cases, the plaintiff (a private
party) faced potential liability to third parties if a court later held the challenged statute
unconstitutional; in each case the Court allowed standing to raise the rights of those third
parties, without discussion. Although one commentator has suggested that these cases did
not involve third-party standing because the (potential) double liability imposed would
amount to a denial of due process to the plaintiffs, such a proposition is far from clear. See
Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J.
599, 641 n.177a (1962).
Subsequent decisions have distinguished the Allen line of cases: Finch v. Mississippi
State Medical Ass'n, 585 F.2d 765, 774 (5th Cir. 1978) (no threat of sanctions for non-compliance); School Dist. of Kansas City v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 440 (W.D. Mo. 1978),
appeal dismissed, 592 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff's duty fully discharged); Athanson
v. Grasso, 411 F. Supp. 1153, 1158 (D. Conn. 1976) (no threat of sanctions for noncompliance).
202. United States v. Harris, 592 F.2d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Mullens, 583 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir. 1978); Big Eagle v. Andera, 508 F.2d 1293, 1297 (8th Cir.
1975); United States v. Lippman, 492 F.2d 314 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1974).
203. Daily v. Bond, 623 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Herrera, 584 F.2d
1137, 1148 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Alfonso, 552 F.2d 605, 615 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977); Paulos v. Breier, 507 F.2d 1383, 1387 (7th Cir. 1974); Pordum v.
Board of Regents, 491 F.2d 1281, 1286 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1973).
204. Cases explainable on this basis include Savina Home Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of
Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 108 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1975); United States v. Maestas, 523 F.2d 316, 322 (10th
Cir. 1975); Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 519 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); Atlas
Roofing Co. v. OSAHRC, 518 F.2d 990, 1012 (5th Cir. 1975), a/f'd on other grounds, 430
U.S. 442 (1977); Tyler v. Ryan, 419 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Mo. 1975). Cases that the courts
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third-party standing on the basis of the causation principle
alone-i.e., the litigant simply did not suffer injury from the statute he wished to challenge. 0 5
On occasion, however, the lower federal courts have applied
the general rule against third-party standing in cases in which
there was no good reason to deny standing, in this author's view.
The case of Corey v. City of Dallas206 in 1974 serves as an example.
Plaintiff owned and operated maisage parlors in San Antonio, and
wished to open a massage parlor in Dallas. He needed a permit
from the city but learned that he would not receive one, because a
city ordinance prohibited anyone from administering a massage to
a person of the opposite sex. He sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the ordinance violated the constitutional
rights of his prospective masseuses. He prevailed in the district
court, but the court of appeals reversed on the ground that Corey
lacked standing to raise the rights of others. The court recognized
the "obstacle" exception to the general rule, but found it inapplicable, stating: "If any masseuses are ever prosecuted under the ordinance, they are free to defend by asserting their own equal protection rights. There is therefore no compelling need to permit
Corey to assert their rights at this stage.

2' 0

7

Courts would probably decide the case differently today, in
light of the Supreme Court's subsequent rulings in Craig and Camore or less explicitly decided on this basis include Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757, 762 (9th
Cir. 1976); Adams v. Askew, 511 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1975); and Bell v. Hongisto, 501
F.2d 346, 355 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). In Bell the court cited the
general rule against third-party standing, and added: "A corollary of this rule is that, if a
statute contains separable provisions, a person may challenge only those provisions which
operate to injure him, and he may not challenge those provisions that cause him no harm."
Id. at 356. The court appeared to assume the severability of the state statute involved.
205. E.g., Swift v. United States, 436 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
920 (1971); M.C.I. Concord Advisory Bd. v. Hall, 447 F. Supp. 398, 403 (D. Mass. 1978);
Acevedo Montalvo v. Hernandez Colon, 440 F. Supp. 238 (D.P.R. 1977). A case which
should have been decided on that ground, but was not, United .States v. Lyman, 592 F.2d
496 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 931 (1979), involved a defendant who moved to
dismiss a criminal indictment against him because it named three unindicted co-conspirators, thus prejudicing him and denying him due process of law. The court found the naming
of the other persons in no way prejudiced Lyman, and then considered whether he could
object on their behalf; it concluded that he could not because no applicable exception to the
general rule applied. Id. at 502-03. The analysis should have stopped after the determination that Lyman had suffered no injury as a result of the alleged misconduct. Accord, Application of Jordan, 439 F. Supp. 199, 209 n.11 (S.D. W. Va. 1977) (dictum); United States v.
Hansen, 422 F. Supp. 430, 436 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
206. 492 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1974).
207. Id. at 497. Judge Clark, concurring in the result, disagreed with the majority on
the standing issue. Id. at 498.
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rey,2 °5 in which the Court effectively ignored both the "relationship" and "obstacle" exceptions articulated in Singleton; as noted
above, the Court in those cases apparently predicated the grant of
standing upon the conclusion that denial of standing to the litigant
would "dilute" the rights of the third party. That appeared to be
true in Corey as well; Corey simply could not legally open a massage parlor, or hire masseuses, unless he obtained a permit. Furthermore, there was no realistic probability that any prospective
masseuse would bring suit to challenge the ordinance. The thirdparty victims remained as yet unidentified, but were not hypothetical. The court conceded that Corey himself suffered injury from
the ordinance, and clearly a victory in the suit would have protected his interests. The Corey decision is therefore wrong, even
under the present law of third-party standing.
0 ' is
Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma2
another wrongly decided case. Two owners of land within the city,
along with an association of builders, challenged a city plan that
seriously limited annual housing development. The plaintiffs prevailed in the district court, arguing that the plan improperly impaired the constitutional right to travel-a claim asserted "on behalf of a group of unknown third parties allegedly excluded from
living in Petaluma."""0 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to make this argument, because they bore no "special, on-going relationship" with the third
parties, and the third parties could assert their own rights.2 ' The
plaintiffs had standing to assert their own rights," 2 but the court
ruled against them on the merits of those arguments. Thus, the
plaintiffs were deprived in the court of appeals of the very legal
argument that had brought them victory in the district court, with
resulting defeat. The results in Craig and Carey suggest that the
Petaluma case was wrongly decided as to the standing of the plaintiff association, because the third-party rights, if any, were "diluted" to the extent of the (plaintiff) builders' inability to build
homes in the city. The landowner plaintiffs complained of the diminution in value and marketability of their land as a result of the
208. See notes 110-33 and accompanying text supra.
209. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1975); accord, Rasmussen v.
City of Lake Forest, 404 F. Supp. 148, 154-58 (N.D. I11, 1975).

210. 522 F.2d at 904.
211. Id.
212. "[Ajppellees have standing to challenge the Petaluma Plan on the grounds . . .
that the plan is arbitrary and thus violative of their due process rights . . . and that the
Plan poses an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce." Id. at 905.
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plan. Their injury, like the injuries of the taxpayers and Penfield
residents in Warth v. Seldin, had no impact on the rights of third

parties, but the opinion reveals no good reason to deny them
standing, either.21
Another facet of the Petaluma decision deserves mention. Although plaintiffs filed suit under section 1983,14 the court stated
213. Three other cases, arguably incorrect even under existing law, are Dresser Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 596 F.2d 1231, 1238 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980);
Fennell v. Carlson, 466 F. Supp. 56 (W.D. Okla. 1978); and Board of Elections v. Lomenzo,
365 F. Supp. 50, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In Dresser the court said that a corporation cannot
assert the rights of its employees under the federal Privacy Act; it appears, however, although the decision is not clear on this point, that the corporation suffered no injury as a
result of the governmental action it challenged.
In Fennell, a prisoner claimed violation of a friend's rights when the friend did not
receive visitor status; the court stated that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert the rights
of the friend. The court did reach the merits, however, and denied the claim.
The plaintiffs in Lomenzo, organizations involved in volunteer voter registration, challenged a state election law prohibiting such activity on Sundays. The court held, as one of
several grounds for its decision, that the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise arguments under
the free exercise and equal protection clauses on behalf of Sabbatarians, because none of the
plaintiffs practiced religion as Sabbatarians. In each of these cases, one can argue that the
restriction or requirement placed upon the litigant diluted the rights of the third parties.
At least one other case, while correctly decided under present law, can be justified only
on the basis of the general rule against third-party standing, and thus is wrong in this
writer's opinion: Appling County v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 621 F.2d 1301, 1307 (5th Cir.
1980). The case involved a challenge by a county and individual taxpayers to the constitutionality of a tax exemption for utilities under state law, asserting the interests of thirdparty bondholders; the holding against standing constituted one of several alternative
grounds relied upon by the court.
At least three recent criminal cases denying third-party standing appear wrongly decided, in this writer's opinion, unless one can explain them under the theory of the Reidel
case, discussed in text accompanying notes 135-42 supra: United States v. Herrera, 584 F.2d
1137, 1148 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701, 710 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 964 (1978); United States v. Garrett, 521 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1975). Herrerainvolved
a criminal prosecution for, among other things, using facilities of interstate commerce to
conduct a house of prostitution; the court did not permit defendants to raise the rights of
privacy of the prostitutes they employed. Pelton and Garrett both involved Mann Act convictions. In Pelton the defendant sought unsuccessfully to raise the right of the woman to
seek legal employment in Nevada, their destination (where prostitution is legal in some areas). In Garrett the defendant apparently argued that the Mann Act denies equal protection
to people (like himself) transporting females across state lines for immoral purposes, as opposed to those who transport males across state lines for immoral purposes. Possibly misunderstanding the defendant's theory, the court observed that Garrett, not a male victim of
interstate transportation, lacked standing to raise this argument. Even if Garrett had argued on the basis of under-inclusiveness of the statute as to victims, as in Rosenthal v. New
York, 226 U.S. 260 (1912), the court should have allowed him to do so, despite the fact that
such an argument will almost certainly fail on the merits. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1939). One should note that, in both Pelton and Garrett, the
court drifted into the merits of the challenges, pointing out that courts had consistently
upheld the constitutionality of the Mann Act.
214. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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that, in addition to satisfying the article III requirement of "injury
in fact," plaintiffs had to satisfy the court-imposed requirement
that the "interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 15 Other lower
courts have also assumed that the "zone of interests" test applies
to a 1983 action.2 16 It is far from clear, however, whether the zone
of interests test has any application outside the context in which it
was announced-judicial review of federal administrative action
under section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act.2117 Regarding the rule against third-party standing as a "corollary" of the
zone of interests test, the Petaluma court, somewhat unclearly, applied the zone of interests test by discussing the exceptions to the
third-party standing rule.2 18 Even if the "zone" test has general applicability, to equate that test with the third-party standing rule is
a mistake.2 1 e In no way does the court-imposed "zone" requirement
interfere with the ability of a federal court to permit third-party
standing, as long as the interest that the litigant may permissibly
215. 522 F.2d at 903 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).
216. E.g., Corey v. City of Dallas, 492 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1974); Boyce v. Rizzo, 78
F.R.D. 698, 704 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See also Cornelius v. City of Parma, 374 F. Supp. 730 (N.D.
Ohio 1974), remanded without opinion, 521 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
955 (1976) (§ 1981 action).
217. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976). Some commentators have expressed the view
that the "zone" test in fact represents an interpretation of the following language in § 702 of
the APA: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof." 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 61, § 3531, at 200; Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1731 (1974); The
Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1, 180-82 (1970). But see DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.02-11 (1976); L. TRIBE, supra note 24 at 658; Davis, The
Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 465-68 (1970); Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 658 (1973).
At least a few other courts have, to some extent, recognized this view. E.g., Baker v.
Bell, 630 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1047, 1061 n.8 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1980); Civic Awareness Ltd. v. Richardson, 387 F.
Supp. 1086 (E.D. Wis. 1975). The striking omission of the "zone" test by Chief Justice Burger in his review of standing requirements in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ'l Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), a case involving judicial review of administrative action, has
led some commentators to speculate that the Court "has either abandoned the test or confined it to those suits in which statutory rather than constitutional claims are at issue." The
Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 260 (1978). For the reasons expressed
therein, the latter alternative appears more likely.
218. 522 F.2d at 904.
219. Professor Tribe clearly equates the two requirements. L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 323, at 100-01. With all respect, I know of no authority supporting his interpretation of the
"zone of interest" test, and he offers none in support of his position.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:393

assert (under third-party standing analysis) falls within the zone of
interests arguably protected or regulated by the relevant statute or
constitutional provision. Thus, to decide whether X may challenge
governmental conduct by asserting the rights of Y under a federal
statute, we must ask: (1) Does X suffer injury in fact from the governmental conduct? (2) Is X permitted to assert the rights of Y.
(This includes, of course, the question whether it will help X to do
one in Y's
so.) (3) Finally,'does the federal statute arguably 22protect
0
hand)?
at
issue
particular
the
(vis-A-vis
position
VI.

CLASS-ACTION MOOTNESS DOCTRINE IN THE SUPREME COURT

Although the rule against third-party standing contains numerous exceptions, it becomes even more difficult to justify when
one considers the closely related doctrine of mootness in the context of class actions. The doctrines are closely related because both
stem from the "case or controversy" requirement of article III.
When a case becomes moot, just as when a plaintiff lacks standing,
the court cannot retain jurisdiction, because a case or controversy
no longer exists.
A.

The General Rule

Mootness results when a plaintiff somehow has obtained the
result he desired from the litigation so that he no longer possesses
the "personal stake" necessary to assure "concrete adverseness.""'
In other words, there is lacking the assurance that the plaintiff has
the personal incentive to pursue vigorously the challenge to allegedly unlawful conduct-the incentive that is normally afforded by
his having something to gain through victory, other than ideological or spiritual satisfaction. A court ordinarily will deem a case
moot even if this personal stake exists throughout the proceedings
at the trial court level, but is lost before the decision of a subsequent appeal.2
220. At least one lower court has committed the conceptual error of omitting the sec-

ond question, thus bypassing the third-party standing analysis altogether, and simply asking
whether the litigant's interest satisfied the "zone" test. Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 490
F.2d 85, 889 (7th Cir. 1973) (employers allowed to assert rights of alien employees).

221. E.g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974).
222. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975).
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B. Exception: Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review,
The primary exception to the mootness doctrine is well-known
and well-established: a court will not hold a controversy moot, notwithstanding the plaintiff's lack of any immediate gain by prevailing in the litigation, if 1) there exists a "demonstrated
probability"2 2 3 that the dispute will recur between the defendant
and the plaintiff, and 2) the factual context in which the dispute
arose generally will not, by its very nature, exist long enough to
allow a definitive disposition of the legal controversy. This type of
controversy is defined as "capable of repetition, yet evading review.""" One must understand that courts have defined the word
"repetition" in this phrase to mean repetition with respect to the
particular plaintiff; because the problem could recur for this
plaintiff, he has the requisite personal stake in the outcome and is
not deemed merely the representative of others.
United States v. New York Telephone Co. 2 5 presents a clear
example of this principle. A telephone company resisted full com-,
pliance with a district court order to cooperate with the FBI in an
investigation of certain telephone users. The FBI had completed
the particular surveillance by the time the case reached the court
of appeals, but little doubt existed that the government would seek
similar court orders in the future, any of which would stay in effect
for only a short time.22 6
Another example, Roe v. Wade,227 established a woman's fundamental right to an abortion. The plaintiff, a pregnant woman,
desired an abortion when filing the suit, but was no longer pregnant by the time the case reached the Supreme Court. The Court
reasoned that she might become pregnant again and desire an
223. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975).
224. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 109 (1978); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 546-47 (1976); Super Tire Eng'r Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 125 (1974); Southern
Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
225. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
226. Id. at 165 n.6. A related, but distinguishable, mootness exception arises in suits for
injunctive relief when the initial skirmish giving rise to the litigation may or may not have

ended; the defendant claims it has, saying in effect, "I'll be good now," but the plaintiff has
no assurance that the defendant truly "has thrown in the towel." If the Court agrees with
the plaintiff, it will not deem the case moot. E.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); United
States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968); United States v.
W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953). In these situations there exists no inherent threat of
mootness stemming from time factors. See generally Comment, A Search for Principlesof
Mootness in the Federal Courts: Part One-The Continuing Impact Doctrines, 54 Tx. L.
REV. 1289, 1292-93 (1976).
227. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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abortion, but could never pursue her challenge from the time of
filing a complaint to Supreme Court review while still in that condition. 26 Obviously, one cannot determine with certainty the
probability that any particular woman will become pregnant and
desire an abortion a second time; however, the Court in Roe took
no apparent interest in this difficulty. As one group of commentators has observed, "[flow levels of probable future impact on present plaintiffs have been accepted in recent cases applying the capable of repetition doctrine to challenges to abortion limitations
' 19 The leniency in the Court's applicaand election requirements."22
tion of this exception is most striking in cases on challenges to requirements for elections already held; the Court has paid absolutely no explicit attention to the likely future political activity of
the particular plaintiffs. 80 The results even in these cases provide
examples of litigants who may well have been simply carrying on
the fight for others.
C. Certified Class Actions
This was the well-established state of the mootness doctrine
before the Court's decision in Sosna v. Iowa in 1975.281 Carol Sosna
had petitioned for a dissolution of marriage in an Iowa state court
one month after moving to Iowa. The lower court dismissed her
petition because of Iowa's one-year residency requirement for obtaining a divorce. She then filed a federal lawsuit challenging this
requirement on constitutional grounds. The district court certified
the suit as a class action, but ruled against Sosna on the merits."
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, Sosna had satisfied the Iowa residency requirement and even had obtained a di228. Id. at 125. Interestingly, the Court denied standing to a co-plaintiff, a woman not
yet pregnant and desirous of an abortion, who believed she might achieve that status.
Would the formerly pregnant woman likely supply more effective advocacy than the notyet-pregnant one, simply because the first one had "been there"?
229. 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 61, § 3533, at 288. See also Note, The
Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARv. L. REv. 373, 385 (1974); Comment,
supra note 226, at 1301-06.
230. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1974); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752,

756 n.5 (1973); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969). See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 333-34 n.2 (1972), concerning a challenge to a residency requirement for voting by
one who had satisfied the requirement by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, but
as to whom the Court held the case not moot. Said one group of commentators: "This ruling strains the supposed requirement of individual future impact almost beyond recognition." 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 61, at 289.
231. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
232. Id. at 397-98.
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vorce; thus, the question of mootness arose. With only Mr. Justice
White dissenting on the mootness issue, the Court, per Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, held the case not moot.2 " He reasoned, in essence, that
a "case" remained for the certified class. When the district court
granted certification, "the class of unnamed persons described in
the certification acquired a legal status separate from the interest
asserted by appellant." 2" In theory, the "capable of repetition, yet
evading review" exception clearly did not apply to Sosna, 3 although it did apply to unnamed members of the class. "[B]ecause
of the passage of time," wrote Mr. Justice Rehnquist, "no single
challenger will remain subject to its restrictions for the period necessary to see such a lawsuit to its conclusion.""' To find mootness
in a case like this, he continued,
would permit a significant class of federal claims to remain unredressed for want of a spokesman who could retain a personal
adversary position throughout the course of the litigation. Such
a consideration would not itself justify any relaxation of the provision of Art. III which limits our jurisdiction to "cases and controversies," but it is a factor supporting the result we reach if
consistent with Art. 111.287
The Court stated that this policy reason for the result limited
its holding: "In cases in which the alleged harm would not dissipate during the normal time required for resolution of the controversy, the general principles of Art. III jurisdiction require that the
plaintiff's personal stake in the litigation continue throughout the
entirety of the litigation." 8 But if article III is satisfied by a live
claim of a class member, why should it matter, for article III purposes, whether the case involves an inherent threat of mootness?
Mr. Justice White dissented vigorously and persuasively, arguing that Sosna
retains no real interest whatsoever in this controversy .... In
reality, there is no longer a named plaintiff in the case....
A
real issue unquestionably remains, but the necessary adverse
party to press it has disappeared .... The legal fiction employed to cloak this reality is the reification of an abstract en233. Id. at 401.
234. Id. at 399.
235. Id. at 400. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), provided precedent for a holding of non-mootness as to Sosna, but represented a very questionable holding.
236. 419 U.S. at 400.
237. Id. at 401 n.9.
238. Id. at 402.
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tity, "the class," constituted of faceless, unnamed individuals
who are deemed to have a live case or controversy with
appellees.2 9
Whether the inherent mootness factor stressed by Mr. Justice
Rehnquist in Sosna makes sense, the Court clearly found it irrelevant the following year, in Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co. 240 Plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of blacks against a
private corporation, alleging racially discriminatory employment
practices. The suit resulted in, among other things, priority hiring
consideration for black job applicants, but the lower court denied
plaintiff's claim for advanced seniority status. Plaintiff appealed
the issue of seniority status to the Supreme Court, but the defendant had already hired and fired (for cause) the named representative. The Court refused to find the class action moot, although this
case in no way presented a situation "capable of repetition, yet
evading review": no inherent reason existed why the named representative could not remain a proper adversary throughout the duration of the litigation.2 4' The Court's opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan did note, however, that the unnamed members of the class in
this case consisted of identified individuals with a clear and continuing interest in the controversy.214 "[T]here is no meaningful
sense," he wrote for the majority, "in which a 'live controversy'
reflecting the issues before the Court could be found to be
2 43
absent.
D.

The Demise of the Certification Requirement

Until 1980, it appeared that the rule of Sosna and Franks applied only when the court certified the lawsuit as a class action, in
compliance, with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, before the
named representative's claim became moot. The Supreme Court
developed this rule in three cases decided in 1975 and 1976."'1 The
Court in Sosna, however, suggested an exception to the certifica239. Id. at 412-13.
240. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
241. Id. at 752-57.
242. Id. at 756.
243. Id. at 756-57.
244. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Board of School Comm'rs. v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975). But, as
Mr. Justice Blackmun pointed out in United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S.
388 (1980), in each of those three cases the defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for
review; the plaintiff did not appeal from a denial of class certification, as he did in Geraghty. Id. at 400-01 n.7.
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tion requirement, and applied it in Gerstein v. Pugh. 45 Gerstein

involved a challenge to pretrial detention of unindicted arrestees
without a prior judicial determination of probable cause for detention. The plaintiffs, who had filed a class action, were pretrial detainees. Inevitably, the plaintiffs were no longer pretrialdetainees
by the time the case reached the Supreme Court; furthermore,
noted the Court, "the record does not indicate whether any of
them were still in custody awaiting trial when the district court
certified the class."'2' The Court found that in this kind of situation, because there existed an inherent threat of mootness to the
named representative before the court could even certify the class,
the case was not moot as to the class. This, then, represented an
24 7
exception to the Sosna certification requirement.
In 1980, however, in United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty,2 " the Court abandoned the prior-certification requirement

of Sosna and Franks, at least when plaintiffs seek, and the court
denies, class certification. Pursuant to adopted Parole Release
Guidelines, the United States Parole Board had denied parole to
Geraghty, a federal prisoner at the time he brought suit. He sued
to challenge the guidelines on both statutory and constitutional
grounds, but the district court denied class certification and entered summary judgment against him. Geraghty appealed, but
prior to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
he was released from prison. The court of appeals held the case not
moot, and reversed the denial of class certification. The Supreme
Court affirmed, in a five-to-four decision.
The Court may have adopted the theory that, given the rule of
Sosna and Franks, a proper class action that would otherwise survive the mootness of the named representative's claim should not
fail because of an erroneous denial of certification by the district
245. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). See also Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978).
246. 420 U.S. at 110-11 n.11.
247. Sosna itself suggested this result, where the Court said cases might arise in which
the controversy as to the named plaintiffs "is such that it becomes moot as to them, before
the district court can reasonably be expected to rule on a certification motion." 419 U.S. at
402 n.11. Mr. Justice Powell, dissenting in the Geraghty case, characterized Gerstein as

falling within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" line of cases, 445 U.S. at 41516, but it seems questionable whether any of the named plaintiffs would likely suffer another arrest. Mr. Justice Powell, who wrote the majority opinion in Gerstein, did invoke the

"capable of repetition" exception therein, observing that "[tihe individual could

. . .

suffer

repeated deprivations . . . ." 420 U.S. at 110 n.11. He recognized, however, that Sosna "ordinarily" requires class certification prior to mootness of the named plaintiffs' claims, and
stated: "But this case is a suitable exception to that requirement." Id.
248. 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
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court; in other words, reversal of the erroneous denial of certification would "relate back" to the date of the district court's decision,
with the rule of Sosna and Franks applying from that time forward. But Mr. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion was not nearly
that direct; indeed, it is difficult to say exactly what his theory was.
The absence of any concurring opinions compounds the problem.249 Some of the surprising statements made by Mr. Justice
Blackmun in the course of his opinion may have significance.
Speaking of the "right" under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to have a class certified, assuming the party meets the requirements of rule 23, he stated: "This 'right' is more analogous to the
private attorney general concept than to the type of interest traditionally thought to satisfy the 'personal stake' requirement."2

0°

He

continued:
[T]he purpose of the "personal stake" requirement is to assure
that the case is in a form capable of judicial resolution. The imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial resolution are sharply
presented issues in a concrete factual setting and self-interested
parties vigorously advocating opposing positions ....

We con-

clude that these elements can exist with respect to the class certification issue notwithstanding the fact that the named plaintiff's claim on the merits has expired. The question whether
class certification is appropriate remains as a concrete, sharply
presented issue ....

Implicit in [Sosna v. Iowa] was the deter-

mination that vigorous advocacy can be assured through means
other than the traditional requirement of a "personal stake in
the outcome." Respondent here continues vigorously to advocate
his right to have a class certified."'
Two lines later, Mr. Justice Blackmun asserted: "The proposed
representative retains a 'personal stake' in obtaining class certification sufficient to assure that Art. III values are not undermined.'

'2

Mr. Justice Blackmun emphasized that Geraghty had standing
at this point only to appeal the denial of class certification; only if
he succeeded in that effort could he proceed, under Sosna, to litigate the merits of "his" claim. Still, nowhere does the opinion clarify how this would-be class representative had a personal stake in
249. Mr. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in the companion case of Deposit Guar.
Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 342-43 n.1 (1980), however, contains comments relevant
to Geraghty as well.
250. 445 U.S. at 403.
251. Id. at 403-04.
252. Id. at 404.
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any aspect of the litigation at this2 point, or how one could describe
him as a "self-interested party.'

63

In a lengthy footnote toward the end of the opinion, Mr. Justice Blackmun explained his surprising emphasis on the pragmatic
"effective advocacy" basis of article III:
Our point is that the strict, normalistic view of Art. III jurisprudence, while perhaps the starting point of all inquiry, is riddled
with exceptions. And, in creating each exception, the Court has
looked to practicalities and prudential considerations. The resulting doctrine can be characterized, aptly, as "flexible"....
.. . We do not attempt to predict how far down the road
the Court eventually will go toward premising jurisdiction "upon
the bare existence of a sharply presented issue in a concrete and
vigorously argued case" .... 5"
Mr. Justice Powell's dissent, for four members of the Court,
details the obvious theoretical weaknesses of Mr. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion. What is significant for the instant analysis
is Mr. Justice Powell's perception-shared by this author-of the
potential impact of the Geraghty decision upon the law of standing. Referring to "the elementary principle that no one has a personal stake in obtaining relief for third parties, through the mechanism of class certification or otherwise," Mr. Justice Powell
observed: "The Court rejects that principle today. 2

5

5

Later, he

noted that "the Court's new perception of Art. III requirements
must rest entirely on its tripartite test of concrete adverseness. .

.

. Although we have refused sieadfastly to countenance

the 'public action,' the Court's redefinition of the personal stake
requirement leaves no principled basis for that practice.

'256

In a

"The Court's view logically cannot be confined
footnote, he added:
'257
to moot cases.

In effect, only Mr. Justice Stevens wrote separately in favor of
the result in Geraghty, by concurring in the result in Deposit
Guaranty National Bank v. Roper,'5" decided the same day as
Geraghty. Roper held that the named representatives of an ostensible class had standing to appeal the denial of class certification,
253.
personal
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

"In the words of his own lawyer, respondent 'can obtain absolutely no additional
relief' in this case." Id. at 413-14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 404-06 n.11.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 421-22.
Id. at 422 n.18.
Id. at 326.
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although the defendant had tendered the maximum amounts of
damages that the named representatives could have recovered. The
Chief Justice's opinion for the majority (with only Mr. Justices
Powell and Stevens dissenting) proffered the theory that the
named representatives retained a personal stake in the litigation
because a classwide recovery of damages would reduce the amount
of attorney's fees they would have to pay. The dissenters pointed
out the factual questionability of this conclusion, but, in theory at
least, the Chief Justice adhered to the personal-stake requirement.
Because the majority found that the litigants retained this personal stake, the decision is not theoretically troubling. In any
event, Mr. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in Roper expressed
a point of view equally applicable to the more dramatic holding of
Geraghty. "In my opinion," he wrote,
when a proper class-action complaint is filed the absent members of the class should be considered parties to the case or controversy at least for the limited purpose of the court's Art. III
jurisdiction. If the district judge fails to certify the class, I believe they remain parties until a final determination has been
25
made that the action may not be maintained as a class action. 9
But it is difficult to disagree with Mr. Justice Powell in his characterization as "a legal fiction" 0 the description of absent class
members as parties for article III purposes only.
Whether or not the Court decided Geraghty correctly, the fact
remains that no member of the Court indicated any desire to overturn the rule of Sosna or Franks,261 by which a certified class enables a suit to survive a mootness challenge.6 2 As Mr. Justice
White recognized in Sosna, even this rule can be seen as a "legal
fiction."
The Justices, in the more recent third-party standing cases,
259. Id. at 342-44.
260. Id. at 358 n.21.
261. Seeking to distinguish Sosna from Geraghty in his dissenting opinion in the latter
case, Mr. Justice Powell made these observations: "Certification is no mere formality. It
represents a judicial finding that injured parties other than the named plaintiff exist ....
Vigorous advocacy is assured by the authoritative imposition on the named plaintiffs of a

duty adequately to represent the entire class. . .

."

Id. at 415 n.8. But in any third-party

standing case other than one of the "hypothetical victim" variety, other injured parties

clearly exist, although not necessarily in the numbers required for a class action. Although
the named plaintiff owes a duty of adequate representation to a certified class, why should a
court consider his advocacy any less vigorous when he has a personal stake in the outcome,
as he must in a third-party standing case?
262. See text accompanying note 239 supra.
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did not ignore the implications of the Sosna theory, just as Mr.
Justice Powell did not overlook the implications that Geraghty
had for the law of standing generally. Mr. Justice Blackmun, in
justifying the grant of third-party standing in Singleton v.
Wulff,263 had noted that one alternative to the physicians' suit in
that case was a class action brought by a pregnant woman, the implication being that bringing such a suit would obviate any potential mootness problems, under the Sosna theory. 26 4 "But if the assertion of the right is to be 'representative' to such an extent
anyway," wrote Mr. Justice Blackmun, "there seems little loss in
terms of effective advocacy from allowing its assertion by a physician. 2 65 Mr. Justice Brennan quoted this language in making the
same argument ini Craig v. Boren.266 The Court thus used the law
of class action mootness to support a liberal application of the law
of third-party standing, despite the statement made earlier -in Singleton that a reason for the general rule against third-party standing was the expectation that the third party himself generally
would be the best advocate of his own rights. The references to the
law of class actions suggest that, ultimately, the Court believes one
representative is as good as another, at least within a certain range
of choices.
Moreover, I submit that a tavern owner like the one in Craig
theoretically would better represent prospective male customers
between eighteen and twenty-one years old, than would a twentyone-year-old male serving as named representative of such a class
in a lawsuit saved from mootness by the Sosna doctrine. The reason: the tavern owner retains a personal stake, other than a purely
ideological one, in the outcome of the suit, whereas the former victim of discrimination does not. Granted, the class representative,
at the beginning of the litigation, might permissibly assert his own
rights, and thus arguably advocate those rights most effectively for
at least some period of time. This need not mean, however, that (a)
the tavern owner is an ineffective advocate, or (b) the litigation
lacks concreteness if initiated by someone other than the
rightholder; indeed, neither of these flaws was present in Craig, nor
need we expect them to exist in third-party standing cases
generally.
The Supreme Court did not necessarily decide Sosna and Ger263. 428 U.S. 106 (1976), discussed in text accompanying notes 84-109 supra.
264. Id. at 117.
265. Id. at 117-18.
266. 429 U.S. 190, 194 (1976).
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aghty incorrectly, although it failed to explain the results adequately.2 1 7 Perhaps Sosna can best be harmonized with article III
by saying that the named representative, having taken on the re-

sponsibility to represent a class of persons adequately, retains a
sufficient stake in the outcome as the representative of the class,
notwithstanding the court's having found his personal claim moot;
it is only in his representative capacity that he is deemed and presumed to care sufficiently about the outcome of the litigation. Indeed, in the typical class action involving a claim for injunctive
relief, only as a representative of others does the named plaintiff
possess any interest, at any stage of the litigation, in having the
lawsuit proceed as a class action. For example, if the district court
dismisses the complaint and denies class certification in such a
case, and plaintiff appeals from both rulings, what will the representative gain personally from a reversal of the certification ruling,
assuming the appellate court reverses the dismissal of the complaint? In contemplating such a question, one realizes the anomalous nature of the named plaintiff's "right" to bring a class action
under federal rule 23. The rule confers upon the plaintiff a procedural right that, by its very nature, often does not benefit the
267. Professor Champlin, writing in 1978, suggested that one could view Sosna as a
decision based on the "inherent time limitation" in the case which brought it close to, but
not quite within, the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" line of cases; a court could
never review the residency requirement on appeal if it deemed the case moot. Champlin,
Personal Stake and Justiciability:Application to the Moot Class Action, 27 KAN. L. REv.
85, 88 (1978). Franks, meanwhile, in Professor Champlin's view, involved a class of identified persons, some of whom the court had already granted partial relief (employment) in the
lawsuit and who clearly desired the additional relief (retroactive seniority) which the representative sought on their behalf. "The members of the class," she suggested, "were in very
much the same position as a named plaintiff vis-a-vis the attorney in terms of the personal
stake-adverseness value." Id. at 98.
But Professor Champlin admitted that problems existed with her suggested explanation
of Sosna (id. at 99), given the language of that and other decisions. Furthermore, the "inherent time limitation" theory fails to satisfy article III's "personal stake" requirement, regardless of its appeal. As to Franks, the involvement of some class members did in fact
make clear that a real controversy still existed, but that fact did nothing to confer a "personal stake" upon the named representatives. (This was true in Geraghty as well. Six presently incarcerated federal prisoners, each of whom Geraghty's counsel represented, had
moved to substitute or intervene. The Court saw no need to rule on these motions in light of
its disposition of the case).
More generally, Professor Champlin suggested that in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action,
which requires notice to the class, and in those rare 23(b)(2) class actions in which, as in
Franks, the class receives notice of the action, the class does provide the functional
equivalent of the named plaintiff's personal stake; by receiving notice and not "opting out"
of the class, she argued, the class member "has indicated his or her desire to invoke the
judicial process." Id. at 105. As a factual conclusion, this seems very doubtful.
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plaintiff in any tangible manner.2 68 It would be odd if the court, on
appeal, could not rectify the wrongful denial of this procedural
right; but how does one reconcile the right to appeal such a ruling
with the requirements of article III, when the named representative has nothing to gain thereby? The notion of "personal stake" in
this context is probably a fiction, and there may or may not be
others in the class who truly care about its fortunes. Still, a live
controversy exists as to the class members; the case has arisen in a

factually concrete setting; and the named plaintiff remains an adequate representative, in terms of the quality of his advocacy, be-

cause, in theory, the court would divest him of his role if he became an inadequate representative. 6 9
The point, for purposes of this article, is that if the kind of

representation that ultimately remained in cases like Sosna and
Geraghty satisfies article III, it is inconsistent and pointless to
cling to a "prudential" rule that purports to prohibit litigants who

clearly satisfy the "personal stake" requirement of article III from
268. "The fiduciary responsibility of representative parties. . . explains why class representatives may ever raise matters bearing on the interests of class members even though
they have no tangible personal interest in these matters-including the very question of
class certification." Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 559 F.2d. 209, 219 (3d Cir.
1977) (Seitz, C.J., concurring), aff'd, 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
269. The fact that a court will not dismiss as moot the class action because of mootness
of the named plaintiff's claim does not necessarily mean that the court will permit the
named plaintiff to continue to represent the class. In Sosna it appeared that Ms. Sosna
would continue to represent the class. Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated that the Court's conclusion as to mootness
does not automatically establish that appellant is entitled to litigate the interests of the class she seeks to represent, but it does shift the focus of examination
from the elements of justiciability to the ability of the named representative to
"fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." . . . [Tihe district
court must assure itself that the named representative will adequately protect
the interests of the class.
419 U.S. at 403.
He then acknowledged the competency of her advocacy thus far, and the lack of any
likely conflicts within the class. The Court in Franks did not squarely address the question.
In Geraghty, the Court decided only that Geraghty could continue to litigate the class certification issue on appeal, but Mr. Justice Blackmun clearly deemed it conceivable that Geraghty would continue to represent the class in all respects. 445 U.S. at 407. See also Deposit
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 343-44 (Stevens, J., concurring). One apparently
can distinguish the situation typified by Sosna from the situation in cases like East Tex.
Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977), in which the Court held that named
plaintiffs who suffered no wrongful injury to begin with could not represent a class of persons who had. Presumably, one must treat a Geraghty-type case like Sosna for this purpose.
See generally Comment, The Headless Class Action: The Effect of a Named Plaintiff's
Pre-CertificationLoss of a Personal Stake, 39 MD. L. REv. 121, 168-72 (1979); Case Comment, Goodman v. Schlesinger and the Headless Class Action, 60 B.U.L. REv. 348 (1980).
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representing the real interests of real third parties 27 0-at least
when, as in class action settings, no reason exists to object on
grounds of lack of concreteness (e.g., ripeness), or inadequacy of
representation.
VII.

SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THIRD-PARTY STANDING

As the previous sections indicate, I recommend that courts

permit litigants to assert the rights of third parties so long as the
litigant appears reasonably likely to represent the interests of
those third parties adequately. I do not mean to suggest that
courts should view the litigant strictly, or even primarily, as the
270. The Sosna-Geraghty line of cases-particularly the emphasis Mr. Justice Blackmun placed in his Geraghty opinion on the quality of advocacy as a primary interest underlying the "case or controversy" requirement of article III-arguably conflicts not only with
the third-party standing cases, but with cases like O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974),
and Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), as well. In each of these cases the court dismissed
complaints in class actions for injunctive relief partly because the named representatives
could not establish any likelihood that they personally would incur any of the injuries of
which they complained. Both suits involved civil rights violations within the criminal justice
system. In each case the complaint depicted numerous instances of past misdeeds and amply supported the reasonable inference that such misconduct would continue to occur, with
members of plaintiffs' broadly-defined class as future victims. No particular person, however, could honestly assert that he or she would be among the future victims. Apparently
because the Court considered the article III problem an alternative ground for dismissal in
both cases, and because in Rizzo the Court considered the merits of the claim for relief,
certain commentators have described both cases as "ambiguous," and have suggested that
the two cases do not prevent a federal court from conferring standing based only on the
injury to absent class members, even if the named representative can show no injury. The
Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REV. 56, 240 n.19 (1976); Developments in the
Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1318, 1467-70 (1976), (hereinafter cited as Class Actions). I regret that I cannot agree with such an optimistic reading of these cases. See also
Kane, Standing, Mootness and Federal Rule 23-Balancing Perspectives, 26 BUFFALO L.
REV. 83, 97-98 (1977).
This means that if the government injures X and also injures members of the ABC
class, X can bring a class action as their representative and, if the court deems him an
adequate representative, continue to represent them even if his own claim for redress later
disappears. If X has no injury of his own, however, he cannot represent the ABC class no
matter how adequately he can represent the class, despite the fact that 1) X belongs to that
class, 2) some members of the class definitely will suffer injury, and 3) no member of the
class can sue presently because nobody can predict which members of the class will suffer
injury. Arguably, no better reason exists to allow X to continue to litigate in the former
situation than to allow him to bring suit in the latter. Indeed, one could argue that the class
has a greater desire for his services in the latter situation, where nobody possesses a better
ability to sue. To adopt this position, however, would necessitate an abandonment or significant redefinition of the traditional "personal stake" requirement of article III, neither of
which is essential to my argument in favor of third-party standing. For a persuasive argument in favor of a much-altered view of the "case or controversy" requirement of article III,
see Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 H.Av. L.
REV. 1698, i706 (1980).
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representative of the third parties, or that the courts should extend
this procedural right to the litigant primarily for advancing substantive interests of third parties; if that were true it would probably lead
me back to the "obstacle" exception stated in Singleton v.
2 71
Wulff.

The position I advocate does not compel me to decide

whether I advocate it for the sake of the litigant or for the third
party; my argument stems from a desire to achieve clarity, consistency, economy, and simplicity in the law, in the absence of reasons to create greater complexity. Still, Mr. Justice Blackmun
showed appropriate solicitude for third-party interests in Singleton.2 7 2 Identifying a litigant as an adequate representative is, of
course, far less important in the third-party standing context than
in the class action context; a loss for the litigant merely creates
adverse precedent for the third parties, whereas a loss for the class
representative fully binds the members of the class.27 3 Although no

one reasonably can expect protection against the unintended creation of adverse judicial precedent because of the efforts of a similarly-situated person, I completely approve of the decision to avoid
creating that adverse precedent when the court reasonably believes
that the litigant may not adequately represent the interests of
third parties, despite his self-interested desire to do so. Unlike Mr.
Justice Blackmun, however, I believe that it is more appropriate
and realistic to make such determinations on a case-by-case basis
than to impose a flat prohibition inspired by that concern. A court
should permit third-party standing, then, unless it believes that
third parties oppose the result sought by the litigant, or that the
litigant may not adequately press for a desirable result for third
parties.
In determining the likely adequacy of the representation of a
class within the meaning of rule 23, courts have considered the
personal character of the representative, his interest in the litiga271. See notes 93-100 and accompanying text, supra.
272. See text accompanying notes 50-52, supra.
273. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). One should note, however, that
the absent class members can avoid the res judicata effect of the judgment in the class
action if they have not received adequate representation (Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67
(5th Cir. 1973)), whereas there are no comparable measures in the third-party standing context. The court in a class action may also decertify the class at any time, approve or disapprove a proposed settlement, break the class into subclasses, allow class members to intervene, and otherwise closely monitor the litigation in order to protect the rights of absent
class members. See generally 1 NEWBERO, CLASS AcTIONS § 1120q (1977). Needless to say,
no comparable measures exist in the area of third-party standing, but, again, the lack of
such measures in this context holds much less significance.
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tion, and the competence and experience of his counsel.17 ' Generally, courts may appropriately consider these factors in the context
of third-party standing as well. Probably the most important factor in determining the litigant's adequacy in representing thirdparty interests would be the well-established requirement under
rule 23, that the interests of the litigant must not conflict with
78
those he seeks to represent.

A. Specific Limitations
1.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN LITIGANT AND THIRD PARTY

Given the existence of the general rule against third-party
standing, federal decisions have not had to rely on considerations
of adequacy of representation.2 6 Yet one can explain at least a few
274. See generally Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-64 (2d Cir. 1968); 7
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1765-67 (1972); 1 Newberg,
supra note 273, at § 1120. See also Note, Associational Standing and Due Process: The
Need for an Adequate Representation Scrutiny, 61 B.U.L. REV. 174 (1981). Commentators
have observed that courts usually presume the competency of counsel. 1 NEWBERG, supra
note 273, at 222 n.316; Class Actions, supra note 270, at 1471 n.93; Comment, The Class
Representative: The Problem of the Absent Plaintiffs, 68 Nw. L. REV. 1133 (1974). Much of
the attention courts give to the financial ability of a named representative to litigate a class
action stems from the fact that, at least in class actions brought under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3), the representative must provide notice to the class and pay the initial cost of doing
so. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See generally Kaye and Sinex, The FinancialAspect of Adequate
Representation under Rule 23(a)(4): A Prerequisiteto Class Certification? 31 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 651 (1977). This aspect of Rule 23 obviously does not apply in the third-party standing
context.
275. See generally Class Actions, supra note 270, at 1471-78; 7 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 274, at § 1758. The court should not interpret mere silence or inactivity by the
third parties as opposition to the litigant's point of view; one can find many possible explanations for such inactivity. See Note, supra 133, at 435 n.60.
276. One case that did rely in part on such considerations is School Dist. of Kansas
City v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 440-41 (W.D. Mo. 1978), in which a local school district
sought unsuccessfully to join as a plaintiff with students seeking to desegregate schools on a
metropolitan-wide basis. After finding unavailable the "official duty" exception to the general rule, see notes 179-84 and accompanying text supra, the district court noted the potential for conflicts of interest between the district and the other plaintiffs; acts of discrimination by the district itself might be discovered, and external factors might lead to loss of
interest in the suit on the part of the district. The likelihood of the district's zealous advocacy of the rights of the students clearly concerned the court.
Two other lower court decisions may be explained on the basis of conflict between litigant and "third party": Friedman v. Harold, 638 F.2d 262 (1st Cir. 1981), and Mountain
States Legal Foundation v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1980). In Friedman, plaintiff
sought to raise the rights of a class of third parties to which defendant belonged. In Mountain States, the plaintiff association sought to assert the interests of Colorado citizens generally; the State of Colorado intervened in opposition to the plaintiff.
In Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980), the court conferred third-party standing, despite a plausible argument of conflict of interest between litigant and third parties.
C. WRIGHT &
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Supreme Court decisions on the basis of conflict, or potential conflict, between the litigant and the third parties whose rights he
sought to raise. Two early cases in which the Court denied thirdparty standing involved employers seeking to assert the rights of
employees in challenges to state regulatory laws arguably beneficial
to the employees. 7 In each case the Court observed that no employee had complained; in one of the cases, 27 8 an employee even

opposed the employer. In 1974, the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion a district court decision that denied a public school
teacher standing to assert the rights of students and parents in
challenging a state law barring discussion of birth control in the
public schools. 79 The district court observed that no student or
parent had intervened or filed his own suit, and the court expressed its concern that parents and students might not object to
the law. In this case, unlike all of the modern cases in which the
Supreme Court has permitted third-party standing, the interests of
at least some members of the relevant class of third parties conceivably stood in opposition to the litigant's assertion of their legal
rights.
Gilmore v. Utah 280 provides the final, well-known example of
such conflict. In 1976, a Utah trial court sentenced Gary Gilmore
to death; his mother filed an application in the United States Supreme Court for a stay of execution. Gilmore, wishing to be executed, filed a response challenging his mother's standing to initiate
any proceedings on his behalf. In a brief per curiam order, the Supreme Court found that Gilmore had knowingly and intelligently
waived any federal rights he might have had; thus, the Court terminated the temporary stay it had granted. The Chief Justice, in a
concurring opinion joined by Mr. Justice Powell, stated that unless
the Court found Gilmore mentally incompetent, his mother lacked
standing to seek relief for her son.28 ' In a separate concurrence,
Mr. Justice Stevens, joined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, agreed.282
Id. at 779-80 n.10.
277. Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571, 576 (1915); Erie R.R. v. Williams, 233 U.S.
685, 705 (1914). The Court permitted standing in a similar case brought by an employee,
New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 189 (1917), apparently on the basis of the nonseverability of the statute.
278. 235 U.S. 571 (1915).
279. Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974), af'g 379 F. Supp.
580 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
280. 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
281. Id. at 1014.
282. Id. at 1017. Four Justices dissented; Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justices
Brennan and Marshall, appeared to say that a condemned man could not waive any eighth
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IDENTIFIED PARTY ABLE BUT UNWILLING TO ASSERT HIS OWN
RIGHTS

Somewhat related to cases evincing a clear or conceivable con-

flict of interest between the litigant and the third party are cases
in which the litigant seeks to assert the rights of a single, identified
third party who, although not objecting to the suit, does not assert
his own rights despite an apparent ability and incentive to do so.
For example, in Davis & Farnum Manufacturing Co. v. Los Ange-

les,255 the plaintiff, a subcontractor, contracted to build a water
tank on certain land in Los Angeles. A city agency had voted to
grant the landowner a permit to undertake the work, but the city
later adopted an ordinance prohibiting this activity in the part of
town in which the land was located. The subcontractor, having begun work, sued the city asserting the constitutional rights of the
landowner against the city. The Court held that the plaintiff lack-

ed standing to assert such rights. The result is intuitively appealamendment rights he might have relative to his execution, and that therefore "there is no
jurisdictional barrier" to prevent his mother from raising those rights. Id. at 1018. Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting separately as well, took the alternate position that Gilmore had not
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. Id. at 1019. Mr. Justice Blackmun deemed the
standing question "not insubstantial," and would have set the matter for a hearing. Id. at
1020.
283. 189 U.S. 207 (1902). See also Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304 (1898), in which
the third party, prior to plaintiff's challenge to a state statute based on the third party's
rights, apparently had received compensation for any injury he suffered under that statute;
and Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1981), where the court denied a shareholder standing to bring a non-derivative action based on injuries to the corporation, despite
the impairment to the value of their stock.
Frissell v. Rizzo, 597 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1980), raised a
similar problem. Plaintiff, a Philadelphia resident, alleged that Mayor Rizzo improperly instructed city officials to withhold all of the city's legal advertising from the Philadelphia
Evening Bulletin, in retaliation for what the mayor considered unfair reporting by that
newspaper. Plaintiff contended that this action had a "chilling effect" on freedom of the
press in the city, and sought to enjoin it. Although plaintiff claimed a "right to hear" (or
read) what a newspaper prints see notes 170-73 and accompanying text supra, the court of
appeals analogized this to a third-party standing case, finding that in general the speaker,
and not the hearer, would be the more effective advocate. Id. at 848. Thus, the case did not
really involve third-party standing and the court probably should not have treated it like
one. The court went on to find a serious risk of conflict of interest between plaintiff and the
Bulletin, and denied standing partly on that basis. Because the newspaper had the incentive
and ability to sue, the court expressly assumed that its decision neither to sue nor intervene
"reflects a considered judgment as to its most advantageous course of action." Id. Furthermore, "a reader's suit is unlikely to be prosecuted with the full sophistication of a claim
" Id. In other words (to maintain the analogy), the court
presented by the newspaper ..
did not consider the plaintiff an adequate representative of the newspaper's rights. Id. at
849 n.7. The court (and perhaps the plaintiff) apparently overlooked the possibility that
such a lawsuit might be welcomed by the city's other newspapers, who might have foregone
bringing suit themselves for fear of retaliation.
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ing, because one would have expected the landowner to assert her
own right in such a case if she had any interest whatsoever in the
matter. One also would have expected the landowner, however, to
want the same result desired by the subcontractor; thus, one could
draw competing inferences about the third party's wishes. As the
situation typified by this case would fall within the ambit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, the court should bring the third
party into the lawsuit when jurisdictionally feasible. If the court
then determines that a conflict of interest exists between the litigant and the third party, it can dismiss the suit for lack of thirdparty standing; alternatively, if the third party seeks any relief, the
lawsuit can continue with both points of view represented.'
In a civil action for damages, the court probably should never
consider a litigant an adequate representative of a third party, absent a class action or a well-defined "privity" relationship traditionally recognized at law. As the Supreme Court has pointed out
in Warth,'5" even when a court permits an association to sue on
behalf of its members, claims for individualized awards of money
damages require the participation of the individual claimants. Furthermore, a litigant generally has no personal stake in seeking
money damages for a third person-unless, for example, he stands
to benefit as the promisee in a third-party beneficiary contract-and thus, under well-established principles, he ordinarily
286
will lack standing to make such a request.
The reverse situation occurs when the litigant seeks damages
87
for himself based upon the violation of rights of third parties.
284. Professor Tribe suggests that a court might appoint amici curiae to provide fuller
representation of various interests. L. TRIBE, supra note 24, § 3-29, at 114 (1978). Note that
the Supreme Court has indicated that the mere presence of the third party in a lawsuit does
not necessarily resolve a third-party standing problem. Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 841 n.44, 857 n.1 (1977). This conforms with the doctrine set forth in
Singleton, although not necessarily with the practice in cases like Craig. If the courts created the rule to ensure effective advocacy without falsely portraying the desires of third
parties, the restriction makes little sense when all points of view are represented. If, on the
other hand, the rule purports to ensure that no one can ever assert the rights of third parties when the third parties clearly do not want to assert those rights, the question becomes
whether the litigant will likely represent the third parties adequately when the facts indicate that at least one of those third parties-already a party to the lawsuit-takes a position
contrary to that of the litigant. In that circumstance, fairness may require a denial of thirdparty standing.
285. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515-16 (1975).
286. See American Dairy Queen Corp. v. Brown-Port Co., 621 F.2d 255, 258 (7th Cir.
1980), where the litigant, a lessee, sought injunctive relief running in favor of the third
party, a sublessee.
287. This occurred in United States Gen., Inc. v. City of Joliet, 432 F. Supp. 346 (N.D.
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The court should reject this option, one would think, for the simple reason that violation of the rights of one person ordinarily gives
rise to no cause of action for damages in favor of anyone else. This
conclusion is troublesome, however, because it applies with equal
validity to claims for declaratory or injunctive relief.2 8 8 The fact
that, to my knowledge, no federal court that has permitted thirdparty standing has ever gone on to ask the question, "What is the
plaintiff's cause of action?", logically suggests that such a question
is entirely subsumed by the third-party standing inquiry. To say
that X may assert Y's rights, then, is to say that X has Y's cause of
action.28 9 One must therefore go further to arrive at the conclusion
Ill. 1977). A developer of housing for low-income families sought damages from a city and its
officials who refused to issue building permits for two housing projects, alleging racial discrimination vis-a-vis prospective tenants. The district court held that the developer lacked
standing to sue for damages for itself based upon the legal rights of tenants, except upon its
claims under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1975). See Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., discussed in text accompanying notes 174-75 supra. Javits v.
Stevens, 382 F. Supp. 131, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) accords with City of Joliet. See also Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 618 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Seneca Nursing Home v.
Kansas State Bd. of Social Welfare, 490 F.2d 1324, 1328-29 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 841 (1974).
288. This particular problem does not arise when the litigant is a defendant, which has
occurred frequently in Supreme Court decisions raising the third-party standing issue, e.g.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (in effect);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), or
when, as plaintiff, he clearly has a good cause of action of his own but wishes to rely on the
rights of third parties to overcome an affirmative defense. E.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245
U.S. 60 (1917) (plaintiff sued for specific performance). This does not mean, however, that a
defense available to one person in a given context is necessarily available to other persons in
other contexts, as cases manifestly have demonstrated. See Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558
F.2d 1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 1977), where the court indicated that an employer, in defense to a
suit by an employee, could not assert the contractual defense of failure to exhaust internal
union remedies (a defense clearly available to the union) unless that exhaustion requirement
could be deemed an implied term of the contract between employer and employee.
289. However, if the third party bases his cause of action on a statute, the court conceivably may read it to preclude its use by anyone other than the rightholder himself. A
court might interpret 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) in such a manner. This section provides in
pertinent part: "Every person who

. . .

subjects

. . .

any citizen

. . .

to the deprivation of

any rights. . . secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." (Emphasis supplied) Must "the party injured," i.e., the plaintiff, be the same person as the "citizen" who
suffered deprivation of his rights? Or may "the party injured" be the one whose rights the
court enforces, and therefore the one to whom the court holds the defendant "liable," even
though "the party injured" is not the plaintiff?. The Supreme Court apparently has never
even considered the relevance of § 1983 to the third-party standing inquiry, although each
of the four cases of the last decade in which the Court expressly allowed a plaintiff to assert
the rights of third parties involved § 1983. In none of those opinions did the Court even
mention § 1983. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), aff'g 398 F. Supp. 321,
325 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), aff'g 399 F. Supp. 1304, 1306 (S.D.
Okla. 1975); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), aft'g 508 F.2d 1211 (8th' Cir. 1974), aff'g
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that litigants should have third-party standing in suits for injunctive or declaratory relief, but not in suits in which the litigant
seeks damages, because in the latter instance the obligation of the
defendant is drastically altered. Whereas suit for injunctive relief
can, at most, enforce a duty already owed to a class of third parties, liability in damages to a plaintiff to whom the defendant owed
no preexisting legal duty represents a new, unexpected, and potentially limitless obligation upon the defendant.
B. Other Possible Limitations
I find acceptable two further limitations on the availability of
third-party standing. First, considerations very different from
those raised in this article, bearing upon important governmental
and individual interests, affect the issue of third-party standing in
the federal law of criminal procedure. Conceptually, the courts
could abolish the rule against third-party standing for all purposes
except the invocation of the "exclusionary rule" of criminal procedure, 90 and I make no recommendation to alter that specialized
doctrine.
Second, it may be appropriate, at the risk of complication, to
draw a distinction for present purposes between federal and state
substantive law. Overwhelmingly, the federal cases dealing with
third-party standing have concerned federal constitutional rights
of third parties. The distinction suggested above, between suits for
damages and suits for injunctive or declaratory relief, would in
itself preclude third-party standing in most actions predicated on
state common law, whereas third-party standing in a suit for specific performance of a contract, for example, would generally require the presence in the lawsuit of all parties to the contract,
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.291 If, however, cases
380 F. Supp. 1137, 1139 (E.D. Mo.); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1975),
aff'g 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (E.D. Mo. 1975). Apparently, then, § 1983 itself poses no obstacle to third-party standing.
290. The Supreme Court has made it very clear that a criminal defendant lacks standing to assert the fourth amendment rights of a third party in seeking to have unlawfully
obtained evidence excluded at trial. United States v. Salvucci; 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980);
United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). See
also United States v. Fredericks, 586 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 1978), and cases cited therein.
291. FED. R. Civ. P. 19 states that a person shall be made a party to the action if:
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of
the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, mul-
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arise under state law that the court considers appropriate for
third-party standing under the criteria suggested in this article, it
may be prudent to omit them from the treatment I suggest, for two
reasons: (1) very few federal cases have raised the third-party
standing issue in such a context, so that (a) little need may exist
for such treatment and (b) problems, as yet unknown, may arise in
extending third-party standing to state-law cases; (2) the Erie doctrine""2 probably compels such a distinction anyway, in a federal
court sitting in a state that does not permit third-party standing.
We could simply avoid Erie questions by explicitly limiting the
new rule to federal claims and defenses raised in the federal courts.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has never offered adequate justification
for the rule against third-party standing in the federal courts. The
Court has endorsed several exceptions to the rule, but has applied
them in a fashion that has impaired the credibility of the Court's
pronouncements on the subject; the two most recent decisions apparently depart entirely from the doctrine previously explained at
length. The lower federal courts have sometimes paid close attention to the Supreme Court precedents, and sometimes have not, all
the while engaging the time, energy, and expense of judges and litigants in trying to fit patterns of facts into one or another of the
Supreme Court's ill-defined "exceptions." In addition, this "prudential" limitation on the standing of litigants who clearly satisfy
the requirements of article III conflicts with the liberality of the
Court's decisions in the area of class action mootness. Although
other commentators 9 " have made reasonable suggestions that, if
tiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
292. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965).
293. Some commentators suggest that "any direct regulation of [a] relationship should
confer standing on any party to the relationship to argue all available grounds for invalidating the regulation," 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 61, § 3531 at 79 (Supp. 1980).
Professor Tribe has suggested that courts should allow third-party standing whenever a
duty imposed on the litigant will likely impair the rights of a third party, or when the court
can characterize the third party's failure to assert his own. rights as an inability to do so. L.
TRIBE, supra note 24, at 112 (1978).
The more complex recommendation by the author of Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REv. 423 (1974), is well-summarized in The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term, supra note 133, at 192 n.32 (1975):
The two situations in which jus tertii claims should be permitted are (1) when
the law imposes a duty on the claimant, the fulfillment of which would deprive
third parties of their constitutional rights, . . . and (2) when the law imposes a
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followed, would clear away the debris and chart a straighter path
for the courts to follow, the rule nevertheless is basically unnecessary and should be abolished. This proposal would not affect the
results in many, if not most, of the cases in which the courts have
denied standing, because courts do and always should deny standing when (1) no causal connection exists between the injury to the
litigant and the precise governmental conduct challenged (which
frequently involves a severable statute), or (2) the litigant raises an
overbreadth claim based on a hypothetical application of a statute
to others.2 9
These two categories of cases aside, the courts should permit
third-party standing (at least for federal claims and defenses), in
suits for declaratory or injunctive relief in the federal courts, unless (1) the court reasonably believes that the litigant will not adequately represent the interests of the third parties whose rights he
asserts, or (2) the factual context lacks the concreteness necessary
to allow satisfactory adjudication of the third-party claims, in
which case ordinary principles of ripeness 295 apply. Adoption of
this recommendation would bring greater clarity and consistency
to the application of article III principles, and result in simpler
and more economical litigation for all participants in third-party
2
standing cases. As far as I can see, nothing will be lost n
duty on third parties that both violates their constitutional rights and modifies
their behavior in such a way as to injure the claimant, who, in turn, must alter
his behavior in a fashion that makes exercise of the third parties' rights more
difficult. ....
Professor Sedler, writing in 1962, set forth an analysis designed to explain, rather than

criticize, the Supreme Court decisions in this area. Sedler, note 201 supra. He concluded
that the Court took into account four factors in deciding third-party standing cases: 1) the
interest of the litigant; 2) the nature of the right asserted; 3) the relationship between the
litigant and third parties; and 4) the ability of the third parties to assert their own rights.
He admitted that the Court had rarely articulated its approach. Id. at 627, 648.
However, one can question his statement that this "factor technique..
can be applied
to a particular case with more ease and certainty than can a general rule subject to numerous exceptions." Id. at 648. Professor Sedler recommended, as a corollary to the "factor
technique," that either party to a professional relationship should have standing to challenge action dealing with that relationship that infringes upon the rights of the other party
to the relationship. Id. at 649.
294. But courts should continue to permit statutory overbreadth challenges based on
first amendment rights. See note 24 supra.
295. Under the ripeness doctrine, a federal court will decline to hear a case it finds
overly abstract, in the sense that plaintiffs have not yet suffered from any "concrete" effects
of the challenged action. See generally Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
296. In discussing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), one group of commentators
suggested that the proper concerns may be ripeness and adequacy of representation,
concluding:
Such considerations may, in the end, bring standing doctrine in this area close to
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the individualized factual determinations of effective representation made in
class actions. . . . The only loss seems likely to be the loss of comfortably certain doctrine; and the present lack of any such doctrine may well be found to
indicate that certainty could be bought only at the price of too many undesirable
results.
13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 61, § 3531, at 81 (Supp. 1980).

